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Abstract 
 
 
The results section of this thesis includes three chapters (Chapter 2, 3 and 4). 
The first two chapters are on theoretical game theory. In both chapters, by 
mathematical modelling and game theoretical tools, I am predicting the 
behaviour of the players in some real world issues. 
Hoteling-Downs model plays an important role in the modern political 
interpretations. The first chapter of this study investigates an extension of 
Hoteling-Downs model to have multi-dimensional strategy space and 
asymmetric candidates. Chapter 3 looks into the inspection game where the 
inspections are not the same in the series of sequential inspections. By 
modelling the game as a series of recursive zero-sum games I find the optimal 
strategy of the players in the equilibrium. 
The forth chapter investigates direct optimization methods for large scale 
problems. Using Matlab implementations of Genetic and Nelder-Mead 
algorithms, I compare the efficiency and accuracy of the most famous direct 
optimization methods for unconstraint optimization problems based on 
differing number of variables.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The general theme of the first and second results sections of this study 
(Chapters 2 and 3) involve mathematical modelling analysing the 
behaviour of the players in different real world situations by game 
theoretical tools; while the third results section (Chapter 4) employs 
Matlab based experiments to investigate the direct numerical 
optimization methods. 
 
Chapter 2 extends the famous Hoteling-Downs model to the case where 
the preferences of the voters do not have to be single-peaked. Where the 
classical results show that the equilibrium point is unique, I show that the 
result is robust under small perturbations. However, the structure of the 
model and the equilibrium change when the perturbations are not small. I 
provide examples and define a criteria which describe the structure of the 
equilibrium points when the tie situation has been resolved by 
perturbation. 
In Chapter 3, I investigate a version of the Inspection game first 
introduced by Dresher (1962), where the inspector may run a mixture of 
partial and full inspections. I investigate the behaviour of players in the 
equilibrium. I show that as long as the opportunity for a full inspection 
exists, the inspector never starts his sequential inspections with a partial 
inspection. As the game has been modelled as a zero sum game, by 
investigating the value of the game we have an efficient tool to compare 
the efficiency of the full and partial inspections.     
In Chapter 4, I investigate the robust optimization methods and compare 
Nelder-Mead and Genetic algorithms. By use of experiments to address 
unconstrained optimization problems I show that Nelder-Mead algorithm 
2 
 
can be more efficient with regarding to accuracy and required time only 
when the objective function has a small number of parameters. 
Nevertheless, Nelder-Mead algorithm is sensitive to the position of the 
initial guess and may stick to a non-optimizer point or local optimum.  
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Chapter 2 
A Generalized Hoteling-Downs model with Asymmetric 
Candidates 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Hoteling–Downs model Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) describes 
a two-party two-stage model of an election, where in the first stage the 
two candidates commit themselves to a policy platform and in the second 
stage voters vote for one of the two candidates. The candidates are 
assumed to be opportunistic, i.e. they only care about winning the 
election. In the classical Hoteling-Downs model voters have single-peaked 
preferences over policies in a one dimensional policy space. In 
equilibrium, voters will vote for the candidate who chooses a policy 
closest to their ideal point and candidates will choose a policy which gets 
the most votes. In an equilibrium where all voters use undominated 
strategies, both candidates propose the ideal policy of the median voter. 
By this, candidates guarantee to get at least 50 percent of the whole 
votes. Although Hotelling-Downs model has a significant role in the 
modern political interpretations, nonetheless some consider the model 
over simplistic and the restrictive assumptions on the preferences to 
guarantee existence of the equilibrium make some researchers like 
Kramer (1973) believe that the model cannot be a good model of reality. 
There may be many factors that make the model unrealistic. It is a 
recognized phenomena that the voters do not just care about the policy 
platform of a candidate. Instead charismatic behaviour, incumbency, 
reputation, etc. also influences the voter. It means that if we take a more 
realistic point of view, even with the same policy platform, one candidate 
can show some advantages over the other one. Cummings (1966) 
analysed the data of US presidential elections from 1924 to 1964. The 
result of his analyses confirms a higher chance of winning for the 
incumbents of the election. Similar analyses have been completed by R. 
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Chacrabarti et al. (2005) on the Lok Sabha elections in India. In contrast to 
the voters in US, they detect an anti-incumbency behaviour amongst the 
voters in India. However, they could not recognise any pattern for this 
behaviour which suggests that, based on the specific time and situation, 
the preference of the voter regarding incumbency may change. 
Meanwhile, they admit incumbency is always the important matter for 
voters in India. To address the asymmetry between the candidates 
theoretically in Hotelling-Downs model, Aragones and Palfrey (2002) 
analysed the classical Hotelling-Down model where one of the candidates 
can take advantages over the other one. They suppose that one of the 
candidates loses the election unless he chooses a platform quite close to 
the ideal point of the voters. The location of the median voter’s ideal point 
has a specific distribution. The authors show that in this case the pure 
strategy equilibria may fail to exist. They also discuss the characteristics of 
the mixed strategy equilibrium point.  
The other consideration about the classical Hotelling-Downs model is the 
number of the policy platforms for the candidates. It is often more 
reasonable to assume that the strategy space of the candidates is not 
unidimensional and single peaked. In fact, the empirical results of many 
studies confirm the multi-dimensional nature of real world voting 
procedures. Stockes (1963) provides some empirical observation of US 
elections which shows the electoral support of the candidates cannot be a 
single dimensional space. Several studies have been done to extend the 
strategy space of the candidates in different versions of the model. Some 
prominent works in this area are Plot (1967), Davis, Groot and Hinich 
(1972); Wendell and Thorson (1974) and McKelvey and Wendell (1976).  
In this study I suppose that voters have strong preferences over a finite 
number of policy platforms. It has been argued by Robert Dahl (1956, pp. 
37-38) that in a democratic society the only compatible rule is the majority 
preference. Hence, it is important that we analyse cases where there is 
more than one alternative and voting procedure is the majority voting.  
 Miller (1977) shows that any majority preference of the voters over finite 
number of the alternatives can be represented as a direct graph called 
“tournament”. Conversely, McGarrey (1953) and Stearns (1959) show that 
any tournament demonstrate at least one profile of voters’ preferences. 
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   The immediate result of extending the strategy space to such a 
multidimensional strategy space is a possibility of losing the Condorcet 
winner1. In fact, Miller (1977) shows that if the representing tournament 
of a majority preference of voters has cycles, then there would be no 
Condorcet winner. He considers the a case of majority voting procedure 
where the orders of the proposals are voted is also a matter. To analyse 
the undominated proposals, he introduced the Condorcet set (minimal 
undominated set) and discuss under which condition the sincere voting 
decision belongs to this set.  
In another work, Miller (1980) shows that the “uncovered sets” of the 
game have more desirable characteristics and are more beneficial to be 
investigated as the solution to the game. 
G. Laffond and J.F. Laslier (1992) viewed use tournament graphs to study 
an extension of the Hotelling-Downs model without single-peaked 
preferences. They look at the two-stage model, where first two candidates 
bindingly propose a policy play form and then an odd number of voters, 
whose majority preferences are described by the tournament, vote for 
one of the two candidates. They show that eliminating dominated 
strategies of the voters in the game leads to a zero-sum game between 
the two candidates. By employing the classical concepts of the zero-sum 
games they analysed the Maxmin strategies of the game. They show that 
the equilibrium of this so-called “Tournament Game” is unique, but will 
often involve mixed strategies. In fact, in equilibrium players are always 
mixing between an odd number of strategies2. A central assumption made 
in the paper is that if both candidates propose the same candidate 
platform, then they will have an equal chance of winning and hence the 
expected payoff is zero.  
This assumption is quite restrictive. Hence, by relaxing this assumption, 
we can model the situation where there is an incumbent in the election. In 
fact, in my model I address asymmetry among the candidates in a multi-
dimensional space. As I mentioned before, this is closer to real world 
situations. Additionally, I also analyse the case when both parties have 
                                                             
1 In a majority voting procedure, a Condorcet winner is the candidate who wins in all the pairing against 
the other candidates. 
2 D. C. Fisher and J. Ryan (1992) show the same results about the equilibrium of the tournament game 
separately and differently, without mentioning its relation to Hotelling-Downs model. 
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incentive/disincentive to choose the same platform. The 
incentive/disincentive might have occurred by a third party or collusion. In 
general, I show how the results depend on resolving the tie situation. The 
classical tournament game studied by D. C. Fisher and J. Ryan (1992) is a 
symmetric zero-sum game, so to be more specific I refer to it as a 
symmetric zero-sum tournament game. In this study the first player 
(possibly the incumbent) is called Player 1 or Candidate 1 and the other 
player is Player 2 or Candidate 2. Besides, the optimal strategy for the 
players is the Maxmin strategy. This study has been organized in seven 
sections.    
After the introduction, in Section 2.2 I provide a literature review on 
generalizing the Hotelling-Downs model which has been utilised by many 
researchers over the years. In Section 2.3, I present tournament game to 
model the Hoteling-Downs model 𝑛-dimensional strategy space. In Section 
2.4, I briefly review the main characteristics of symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game which have been studied by both D. C. Fisher and J. 
Ryan (1992) and G. Laffond and J.F. Laslier (1992). We see that the mixed 
equilibrium point in the model is unique, also in equilibrium players are 
mixing between odd number of the strategies. Adding to the previous 
knowledge about the symmetric tournament game I prove that the unique 
equilibrium point is also regular in the sense of Harsanyi. Later, in Section 
2.5 the assumption of symmetry among the candidates is relaxed. By 
employing the regularity characteristic of the equilibrium, I show that the 
uniqueness of the equilibrium will be kept if the amount of the asymmetry 
is negligible among the candidates.  
In Section 2.5, I also analyse the behaviour of the equilibrium point under 
certain large perturbations of the symmetric zero-sum tournament game, 
namely “asymmetric zero-sum tournament game” and “symmetric non 
zero-sum tournament game”. We can observe that under large values of 
perturbation the structure of the game can be very different and the game 
can have several equilibria with varying support.  A symmetric equilibrium 
does not have to exist. However, in Section 2.6 I provide sufficient 
conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in these two classes of 
games. Section 2.7, investigates and analyses the equilibrium point for the 
regular tournament games. I show that the incumbency in any level does 
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not affect the equilibrium point. I also calculate the value of the game for 
a regular tournament game. 
2.2 Literature Review on Generalization of Hoteling-Downs 
Model  
Despite the significant role of the Hotelling-Downs model on modern 
political interpretations, over simplicity of the model is quite restrictive. In 
this section I review some of the studies which have generalized the 
Hoteling-Downs model with respect to asymmetry between the 
candidates and dimension of the strategy space.  
The asymmetric among the voters in the classical Hoteling-Downs model 
has been targeted in many studies. Some of the more famous studies are 
Anderson and Glomm (1991), Ingberman (1992) and  E. Aragones and T. R. 
Palfrey (2002). 
Anderson and Glomm (1991) have considered two candidates election 
where the voters care about two different features of a candidate. Firstly, 
the policy they choose and secondly the non-policy factors such as 
charismatic behaviour, incumbency or integrity. The non-policy features 
are the factors that may cause asymmetry between the candidates and 
will make one candidate gain an advantage over the other. A candidate on 
the one hand likes to choose a policy platform close to the median voter’s 
ideology; however he also does not want to compromise his ideal policy 
because of the non-policy features. The median’s voter evaluation of the 
non-policy advantages of the candidate 𝑖, is shown by 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 where 𝛼𝑖 is 
the scale for measuring the advantages of the candidates 𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 is the 
standard normal distribution. Another function like 𝑓(|𝑥𝑖|) also measures 
the evaluation of the median’s voter of the candidate’s policy platform 
(𝑥𝑖). Hence, the utility of the median voter will be 𝑢(𝑥𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 −
𝑓(|𝑥𝑖|), 𝑖 = 1,2. This form of modelling gives the chance to analyse the 
Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium. Hence, the authors find that there is 
difference in behaviour of the candidates when they have simultaneous 
move or the moves in order. In fact, if I suppose that the distribution and 
the position of the median voter is common knowledge for both 
candidates, the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy is much closer to his 
ideal point.  
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Another work to address the asymmetric candidates in Hotelling-Downs 
model is E. Aragones and T. R. Palfrey (2002) where one of the candidates 
obtains advantages over another. The distribution of the median voter 
ideal policy is a common knowledge for both of candidates and they can 
select their strategy from the finite number of positions. In fact, they 
suppose the policy space as 𝑥𝑖 =
𝑖−1
𝑛−1
, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 on the interval [0,1], 
where voters have Euclidean preferences. If we call the advantaged 
candidate by Candidate A (with committed strategy 𝑥𝐴)  and the 
disadvantaged one by Candidate D (with committed strategy 𝑥𝐷) then a 
voter with strategy preference 𝑥𝑖 , has the utility  if Candidate A wins  
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝐴) = 𝛿 − |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝐴| and 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝐷) = −|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝐷| where 𝛿 > 0. The model 
is equivalent to the classical Hotelling-Downs model if 𝛿 = 0. It means that 
𝛿 determines the advantage of Candidate A over the other Candidate. In 
first step, the authors show that there is no pure strategy for the 
candidates in this game, and they always mix between their strategies. 
Later, they analyse the model for a small value of  𝛿 (0 < 𝛿 <
1
𝑛−1
) and 
large one. They discover that the behaviour of the candidates are different 
for small and large value of 𝛿. In fact, for small value of 𝛿, Candidate A 
wins if and only if his ideal policy and the ideal point are as close as 
Candidate D’s policy and ideal point. This is not a case for large value of 𝛿. 
Hence, the equilibrium is different in these cases. They also show that the 
solution depends on the even or odd number of the strategies and the 
advantaged candidates has always higher expected payoff. However for 
very large number of strategies his advantage shrinks to zero.  
The other important issue analysed in many studies is the number of 
strategies. The assumption of a one dimensional strategy space is far from 
the reality. However, multi-dimensional strategy space gives rise to a 
number of new issues such as preferences of the individuals in a group or 
combination of strategies, ordering the preferences over the strategies, 
complexity of strategy space etc. I should also mention the possibility of 
the non-existence of a Condorcet winner, which is known as Condorcet’s 
voting paradox. 
To address the multidimensional strategy space, O. A. Davis, M. H. 
GoorDeGroot and M. J. Hinich (1972) considered the each alternative of 
the voters as a point in Euclidean space. It means that a point like 
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?́? = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) represents a possible alternative.  Each individual in 
the society has the same set of dimension of choice and locate the 
alternatives in the Euclidean space similarly. The space of all alternatives is 
called 𝐸𝑛. They suppose that each individual has a preferred point like 𝑥, 
hence his utility over all the other strategies is defined as follow 
𝑢𝑖(‖𝑦 − 𝑥‖) = ‖𝑦 − 𝑥‖
2 = (𝑥 − 𝑦)′(𝑥 − 𝑦). 
By defining above utility function, they also define the preference relation 
over the strategies. By their definition alternative 𝑦 is preferred to 𝑧 (𝑦𝑅𝑧) 
if Pr(‖𝑦 − 𝑋‖ ≤ ‖𝑧 − 𝑋‖) ≥ 1/2. In fact, 𝑦 is preferred to 𝑧 if and only if 
at least half of the population prefers 𝑦 to 𝑧. 
This relation alone is not transitive; however the authors provide the 
necessary and sufficient condition to define a transitive relation over 𝐸𝑛 
by 𝑅. This transitive relation can completely orders the point in 𝐸𝑛. 
Besides, the same necessary and sufficient condition for the transitive 
relation can be employed to show the existence of the Condorcet point. 
In another work, R. E. Wendell and S. J. Thorson (1974) consider the point 
𝑥?́? = (𝑥𝑖
1, 𝑥𝑖
2, … , 𝑥𝑖
𝑛) as the position of each voter regarding the different 
strategies. By knowing the most preferred location of each voter they 
define a loss function for all the other positions. The loss function can 
define some indifferent contours3 for each voter which are equivalent to 
the concept of Norm functions4. By this mean, it is proved that if all the 
voters use the same norm then the equilibrium point is the position of the 
multidimensional median. 
Miller (1977) discusses the majority voting procedure among 𝑚 > 1 
number of proposals where voting procedure may depend on the order in 
which the proposals are voted on. First of all, he argues that the majority 
preference of the voters can be shown in a directed graph name 
“tournament”. Later, by analyse the possible availability of paths and 
cycles between the vertices, he investigates the possibility of a Condorcet 
winner in his model. He shows that when there is no undominated 
strategy then there will be a cycle between the vertices. That means when 
                                                             
3 A indifferent curve is a curve showing different bundle of strategies which the voter is indifferent.  
4 The function ‖. ‖ ∶ 𝑅𝑛 ⟶ 𝑅 is the Norm function if it satisfies following conditions for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑛  
1) ‖𝑥‖ ≥ 0.   2) ‖𝑥‖ = 0 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑥 = 0.    3)  ‖𝛼𝑥‖ = 𝛼‖𝑥‖;  𝛼 > 0.  4) ‖𝑥 + 𝑦‖ ≤ ‖𝑥‖ + ‖𝑦‖.   5) 
‖−𝑥‖ = −‖𝑥‖.  
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there is no undominated strategy there will be also no Condorcet winner. 
Hence, he introduces the concept of minimal undominated set (Condorcet 
set). Condorcet set includes all the vertices which are not dominated by 
any other vertices; also any subset of this set has the same characteristics. 
The author shows that for his model represented by a tournament the 
Condorcet set exists and is unique. Hence, he also investigates the main 
characteristics of this set and shows that many binary majority voting 
processes can end up with a strategy selected in Condorcet set. However, 
despite being handy to analyse the majority voting systems, Condorcet set 
can be very large (possibly even equal to the set of the whole strategies) 
and it may include the Pareto-inefficient5 points. So, later Miller in his 
other work in 1980 introduces another possible solution for his model 
named “uncovered set”. The uncovered set is the set of all the vertices 
from which every other vertex is reachable with the path with no more 
than two vertices length. Miller (1980) shows that the uncovered set 
always exists and it is smaller than Condorcet set, however it includes all 
the Pareto-efficient points.  
G. Laffond and J.F. Laslier (1992)  are the first to use the tournaments to 
extend the Hotelling-Downs model to the set of the preferences which are 
not single peaked. Using weakly dominated strategies (and assuming that 
each candidate is elected with equal probability if they both propose the 
same policy) they reduce the model to a zero-sum game defined by a 
tournament graph. Hence, Maxmin strategies (see Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944)) can be considered as the optimal solution of the 
game. They show that while the value of the game is zero, the optimal 
solution of the game is zero. The authors also investigate more 
characteristics of the optimal solution and show that in equilibrium 
candidates always mix between odd number of the strategies. This form of 
analysing seems to be more practical and inclusive rather than all the 
previous results. However it is still far from the reality as the main 
assumption of the model is symmetry among the candidates.  
They are some studies like McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) and 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) which are capturing both 
                                                             
5 Pareto-efficient is the state where it is impossible to increase the payoff of one player without 
decreasing the payoff another player. 
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multidimensional nature of the strategy space and asymmetry among the 
candidates, however there is no previous study to model the election with 
binary preferences over strategies with asymmetric candidates. In this 
study, I consider the model introduced first by G. Laffond and J.F. Laslier 
(1992) and relax the assumption of symmetry between the candidates.  
 
2.3 The Model 
Tournament game is introduced and analysed by D. C. Fisher and J. Ryan 
(1992) and G. Laffond and J.F. Laslier (1992). In this section I show and 
explain how these games can generalize the Hoteling-Downs model to the 
n-dimensional strategy space.  
2.3.1 The Relation between Tournament Games and Multi-
Dimensional Hotelling-Downs Model 
In this section I describe the relationship between the Hotelling-Downs 
model of two-candidate elections, where voters can have arbitrary strict 
preferences over finitely many policy platforms, and certain matrix games 
that I will call them in general, tournament matrix games.  
This extended Hotelling-Downs model is a game in extensive form whose 
players are the two candidates, Candidate 1 and Candidate 2, and an odd 
number of voters. 
There are finite numbers of policy platforms (𝑛 > 1). Voters have strict 
preferences over the 𝑛 policy platforms, i.e. a voter is never indifferent 
between any two of them. The candidates are assumed to be 
opportunistic, i.e. a candidate gets utility +1 if he wins the election and -1 
if he loses it. The timing is as follows: In the first stage each of the two 
candidates chooses simultaneously and independently a policy platform. 
The voters observe these choices and then each voter simultaneously and 
independently votes for one of the two candidates. No voter can abstain. 
Because the number of voters is odd, exactly one candidate will win the 
election by a simple majority rule. This candidate gets payoff +1, the other 
loses the election and gets payoff -1. The policy selected by the winner is 
implemented and this determines the utility of the voters. 
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  It is easy to see that a strategy of a voter is undominated if and only if for 
any pair of distinct policy platforms offered by the two candidates the 
voter votes for the candidate who adopted his preferred among the two 
platforms. Suppose the two candidates select different policies and the 
voters use only undominated strategies. Then that candidate wins the 
election whose chosen policy is preferred by a majority of voters.  
Which policy 𝑖 wins in a simple majority vote over which policy 𝑗 is usually 
summarized by a directed graph 𝑇 called a “tournament” in the literature 
(see Miller (1977)).  This graph has 𝑛 vertices. There is an arc from node 𝑖  
to node 𝑗 if a majority of voters prefer policy platform 𝑖  over policy 
platform 𝑗. I use 𝑖 → 𝑗 to show that strategy 𝑖  dominates strategy 
𝑗 (similar notation to Miller (1977)).  Alternatively, one can work with the 
associated 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix 𝐾(𝑇) = (𝑘𝑖𝑗)𝑛×𝑛 defined as follows. The matrix 
has zeroes on the main diagonal. It has entry +1 in row 𝑖  and column 𝑗  if a 
majority of voters strictly prefer alternative 𝑖  over  𝑗  and entry -1 if it is 
the other way around. I call 𝐾(𝑇) the tournament matrix associated with 
the voter’s preferences. Example 2.2 shows a simple example of a 
tournament and the matrix game of a symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game.  
It is easy to see that in a perfect equilibrium of the game no voter will use 
a dominated strategy (see Selten (1973)). If both candidates offer the 
same policy platform, all voters are indifferent between the two 
candidates and hence every possible voting profile is optimal. Clearly, for 
any probability 0 < 𝛼 < 1 there is a voting pattern such that the first 
candidate wins with probability 𝛼. I hence have the following result. 
Theorem 2.1. Consider a Hotelling-Downs model with arbitrary 
preferences of the voters over the finitely many policy platforms. Let 𝑲 be 
the tournament matrix determined by the voters’ preferences. Hence, for 
every perfect equilibrium of this game there exists a diagonal matrix 𝑫 
with entries not exceeding 1 in absolute value such that the strategies of 
the candidates in the equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium of the matrix 
game 𝑲+𝑫. Conversely, let 𝑫 be any diagonal matrix whose entries do 
not exceed 1 in absolute value. Then every Nash equilibrium of the matrix 
game 𝑲+𝑫 can be extended to a perfect equilibrium of the Hotelling-
Downs model.    
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I call a matrix game 𝑀 = 𝐾 + 𝐷 with 𝐷 as described a general tournament 
matrix game. The papers Fisher and Ryan (1992) and Laffond et al. (1993) 
consider the special tournament matrix games where the matrix 𝐷 is zero. 
I often refer to the matrix game 𝐾 as a symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game. This corresponds to the case where each voter votes for each 
candidate with equal probability when both candidates chose the same 
platform.  In Section 2.4 I describe briefly the results of these papers. 
2.3.2 Symmetric zero-sum tournament games 
“Paper, Scissor and Stone” is the simplest form of a symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game where the player has three different strategies. The 
rules of the game can be shown with a graph (Figure 2.1) or a matrix game 
(Table 2.2). In this game two players simultaneously and independently 
choose a strategy among the three. If both choose the same strategy then 
the game has been tied otherwise scissor beats paper, paper will beat 
stone and stone beats scissor. The situation can be shown with a graph as 
follows 
Example 2. 2.6 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 1. The Graph representing  “Scissor, Paper, 
Stone game” 
 
 
 
[
0
−1
1
1
0
−1
−1
1
0
] 
 
Table 2. 2. Matrix game of “Scissor, Paper, Stone  game” 
As we can see in this game there is a cycle between strategy preferences 
of the players. Hence, there is no undominated point which means that 
there is no Condorcet winner. However, if a player mixes between his 
strategies with probability of 
1
3
, then he would assure himself the expected 
pay off of zero. In fact, this payoff is the maximal value he can assure 
                                                             
6 In general by Miller (1977)’s results we know that there is always a profile of voters that yield the tournament 
graph. However, for certain graphs we may need a certain minimum number of voters (or a specific number of 
voters). In this example, we need at least three voters to yield the graph.  
 
Stone 
Scissor Paper 
Scissor 
Paper 
Stone 
Scissor Paper Stone 
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himself. Hence, {
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
} is Maxmin strategy for the player. Maxmin 
strategies are also called optimal strategies for the player.  
In Example 2.2 the alternatives can present possible real world 
alternatives for candidates. For example, scissor can represent “Lower 
taxation”, paper “Free education” and stone “improve infrastructure”.   
Empirical examples of the cycling preferences over alternatives and 
Condorcet paradox has been detected in real world situations through 
different studies. One example is the work by Kurrild-Klitgard (2001) about 
a poll of Danish voters preferred prime minister in 1994. In this study, by 
paired wise comparison between three candidates the author shows that 
voters have a cycling preference over candidates.    
Example 2.37 provides another example of a symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game, which has six strategies. Similarly, to the “Paper, 
Scissor and Stone” in this game there is no Condorcet winner.  The optimal 
mixed strategies for both players are {0,
1
3
,
1
9
,
1
9
,
1
9
,
1
3
}. 
Example 2.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 3. A Tournament graph with six vertices 
representing a symmetric zero-sum tournament game 
with 6 strategies. 
 
 
 
K=
[
 
 
 
 
 
0
−1
1
1
1
−1
1
0
−1
−1
−1
1
−1
1
0
−1
1
−1
−1
1
1
0
−1
−1
−1
1
−1
1
0
−1
1
−1
1
1
1
0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 4. A matrix game of the graph in Figure 2.3, 
representing the same symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game of Figure 2.3. 
 
 We can find the cycle in this example where 6 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 5 → 1 →
6. This means that there is no undominated strategy and therefore there 
is no Condorcet winner in the game. Besides, As we see in the “Paper, 
Scissor and Stone game” and Example 2.3;  𝐾(𝑇) is always a skew-
symmetric matrix. It means that −𝐾 = 𝐾𝑇. To analyse the tournament 
games more precisely I provide following definitions. 
                                                             
7 This example has been also analysed in D. C. Fisher and J. Ryan (1992). 
1 
3 
2 
4 
5 
6 
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Definition 2. 4. Let 𝑃 = (𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑛) be a mixed strategy for a tournament 
game with 𝑛 strategies. Strategy 𝑖 is the support of  𝑃 if 𝑝𝑖 > 0. 𝑃 is called 
a full support mixed strategy if each 𝑝𝑖 is strictly positive. 
Definition 2. 5. Let 𝑷 = (𝒑𝟏, … , 𝒑𝒏) be an optimal strategy for a 
tournament game with 𝒏 strategies. Strategy 𝒊 is called a “bad quality” 
strategy if 𝒑𝒊 = 𝟎, (see Laffond and Laslier (1993), pp. 187). 
Hence, by Definition 2.5 Strategy 1 in Example 2.3 is bad quality strategy. 
We can observe easily that in Example 2.3 in the equilibrium, for a bad 
quality strategy the probability of winning is less than probability of losing, 
while for all the other strategies they are equal. This is the reason why 
both players play the bad quality strategy with zero probability.  
In this extension of Hoteling-Down model there is no single peak 
preferences over the voters. The variety of voter’s options makes the 
strategy space of each party multi-dimensional. For example, in Scissor, 
Paper and Stone game we see that there is no single preferred strategy 
but there is a cyclic preference over all the strategies. As the “tournament 
game” is symmetric and zero sum, to be more accurate we can refer to it 
as a “symmetric zero-sum tournament game”.  
2.4 Main Characteristics of the Model 
2.4.1. The Value and Optimal Strategy of Symmetric zero-sum 
Tournament game   
D. C. Fisher and J. Ryan (1992) and G. Laffond and J.F. Laslier (1993) in two 
separate works, discuss the value and optimal strategies of the symmetric 
zero-sum tournament games. Here, I provide the brief review of the main 
theorems and characteristics of the symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game analysed in both papers. 
 In a symmetric zero-sum tournament, 𝑇, with 𝑛 different strategies for 
both players, if Player 1 plays a mixed strategy 𝑃 and Player 2 responds 
with strategy 𝑖  (node 𝑖) then the expected payoff is ((𝐾(𝑇)𝑃)𝑖 . In a 
maxmin strategy Player 2 wants to select a strategy to minimize Player 1’s 
payoff (as it is a zero-sum game this will increase her payoff). On the other 
hand, player 1 wants to maximize his own payoff as well. Hence, if  𝑣 
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denotes the value of the game then 𝑃 is the optimal strategy of the game 
if it satisfies the following system. 
𝑣 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐾(𝑇)𝑃 𝑖) ,  𝑃 ≥ 0,  1
𝑇𝑃 = 1; 𝑃 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛).             
(2.4.1.1)      
We know that in a symmetric zero sum game the value is always zero, 
hence in the system (2.4.1.1), 𝑣 = 0. As a result, the system (2.4.1.1) can 
be simplified to  
{
𝐾(𝑇)𝑃 ≥ 0,
𝑃 ≥ 0,
1𝑇𝑃 = 1.  
                                                                                        (2.4.1.2)                                                                                                 
Lemma 2. 6.  Let 𝒑 and 𝒒 be optimal strategies for a symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game on a tournament, T; then 𝒒𝒊 > 𝟎 implies (𝑲(𝑻)𝒑)𝒊 =
𝟎.  (See Fisher and Ryan (1993)). 
By Lemma 2.6 we can conclude that in a symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game for an optimal strategy all the nodes will be selected from those that 
make the other player expected payoff zero.  
Definition 2. 7. A subtournament game8, ?́?, is positive if the optimal 
strategy is full support.  
Following theorems and corollary show that in a symmetric zero-sum 
tournament games the optimal strategy of the players is unique. 
Theorem 2. 8. Let 𝑻 be a symmetric zero-sum tournament on 𝒏 nodes, 
Then 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐾(𝑇)) = {
𝑛, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛,
𝑛 − 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑑𝑑.
 
Corollary 2. 9. In a positive symmetric zero-sum tournament game, in 
equilibrium players are mixing between odd number of strategies. 
Proof: 
𝐾(𝑇)𝑃 = 0 has a nonzero solution only if 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐾(𝑇)) < 𝑛. So 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐾(𝑇)) is equal to 𝑛-1, and as a result 𝑛 is odd. 
                                                             
8 The tournament game ?́? is the sub tournament game of the tournament game 𝑇, if the graph of 
tournament game ?́? is the subgraph of the graph of tournament game 𝑇. 
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Theorem 2. 10. The symmetric zero-sum tournament game on n nodes 
has a unique optimal strategy, p, such that 𝒑𝒊 > 𝟎 on a positive 
subtournament (which must have an odd number of nodes). 
Proof:  
Let 𝑝 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛)
𝑇  and 𝑞 = (𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑛)
𝑇be two solutions to (1.2). 
Let S be the subtournament of 𝑇 on those nodes where either 𝑝𝑖 > 0 or 
𝑞𝑖 > 0 (or both). Since both p and q are solutions to (1.2), by lemma 1.2.1 
we can conclude that 𝐾(𝑆)𝑝𝑆 = 𝐾(𝑆)𝑞𝑆 = 0 since 𝑝𝑆 ≠ 0 then by 
theorem 1.2.3 we know that the null space of K(S) has dimension at most 
one, ∃𝛼 ∈ ℝ; 𝑝𝑆 = 𝛼𝑞𝑆 . Since 1
𝑇𝑝𝑆 = 1
𝑇𝑞𝑆 = 1, 𝑝𝑆 = 𝑞𝑆 and hence p=q. 
We know that 𝐾(𝑆)𝑝𝑆 = 0 and 𝑝𝑆 > 0, hence S is a positive 
tournament,∎. 
As the game is symmetric when one strategy is a bad quality strategy for 
one player, it will suppose bad quality strategy for other player as well. 
Hence, both players can delete that strategy from their set of strategies. 
The tournament game can be reduced to a sub tournament game where 
all the strategies are playing with positive probabilities. 
2.4.2. Regular Equilibrium in the Symmetric zero-sum Tournament Game 
In this section, I show that the unique equilibrium point in symmetric zero-
sum tournament game is regular in the sense of Harsanyi (1973). (For 
more explanation about regular equilibrium see Appendix A.4)   
Definition 2. 11.  Let 𝑮 be a matrix game of a two player zero-sum game, 
where 𝑮𝒏×𝒏 = [
𝒂𝟏
⋮
𝒂𝒏
] ; then 𝑪𝒏×𝒏 = [
(𝟏,… , 𝟏)
𝒂𝟐 − 𝒂𝟏
⋮
𝒂𝒏 − 𝒂𝟏
] is called the computational 
matrix of the matrix game 𝑮. 
Definition 2. 12. Let 𝑮 be a matrix game of a two player zero-sum game, 
where 𝑪 is its related computational matrix; then 𝑪𝒏×𝒏𝑷 = [
𝟏
𝟎
⋮
𝟎
]
𝒏×𝟏
, 𝑷 ≥ 𝟎 
is called computational system.  
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Theorem 2. 13. For a positive symmetric zero-sum tournament game, T, 
with 𝒏 strategies, computational matrix of the matrix game has full rank.  
Proof: 
We know that for a positive symmetric zero-sum tournament game , T, 
the equilibrium is unique. I denote this unique optimal solution by 
𝑃 = (𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑛); where 𝑝𝑖 > 0. I also denote the matrix game of the game 
by 𝐾 = [
𝑆1
𝑆2
⋮
𝑆𝑛
] and its related computational matrix by 𝐶. As 𝑃 is the 
maxmin strategy, hence it should satisfy following system  
{
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣
∑ −𝐾𝑃𝑇𝑛𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑣,
∑ 𝑝𝑖 = 1,
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖 ≥ 0.
                                                                                      (2.4.2.1) 
where 𝑣 is the value of the game. As the value of the game is equal to 
zero, and 𝑃 is the only equilibrium, hence we have                
𝑆𝑖𝑃 = 0, 𝑖 = 1. . 𝑛;    ∑𝑝𝑖 = 1; 𝑝𝑖 > 0 ;
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(See Appendix A.3, for full description on how to find the Maxmin 
strategies for a zero-sum games). 
Hence, 𝑃 satisfy following system 𝐶𝑃𝑇 = [
1
0
⋮
0
] , 𝑃 > 0; which is the 
computational system for matrix game 𝐾. Hence, 𝐶 is invertible and has 
full rank.∎ 
Theorem 2. 14. The equilibrium point in the positive symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game is regular.  
Proof: 
Assume a positive symmetric zero-sum tournament game with set of pure 
strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 as 𝑆 = {𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛}; where 𝐾 =
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(𝑘𝑖𝑗)𝑛×𝑛 is the game matrix for Player 1. Hence, 𝐾
𝑇 is the game matrix for 
Player 2. We also know that, 𝐾𝑇 = −𝐾. 
𝑝 = (𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑛), 𝑞 = (𝑞1, … , 𝑞𝑛) are mixed strategy vectors, and the Nash 
equilibrium point is 𝑃 = (𝑝, 𝑞). Hence, the utility functions are 
𝑢1(𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝑝𝐾𝑞
𝑇 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑗𝑖,𝑗  and 𝑢2(𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝑝𝐾
𝑇𝑞𝑇 = ∑ −𝑖,𝑗 𝑝𝑖𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑗 . 
We know that the set of Nash equilibrium points is not empty.  We define  
𝐹1
(1)
, 𝐹2
(1)
, … , 𝐹𝑛
(1)
 and  𝐹1
(2)
, 𝐹2
(2)
, … , 𝐹𝑛
(2)
 as follows 
 𝐹1
(1)
= ∑ 𝑝𝑖 − 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 𝐹1
(2)
= ∑ 𝑞𝑖 − 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
𝐹𝑖
(1) = [𝑢1(𝑠1, 𝑞) − 𝑢1(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑞)] × 𝑝𝑖 = [∑ (𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 ] × 𝑝𝑖; 
𝑖 = 2,… , 𝑛. 
𝐹𝑗
(2) = [𝑢2(𝑠1, 𝑝) − 𝑢2(𝑠𝑗 , 𝑝)] × 𝑞𝑗 = [∑ ((−𝑘1𝑡) − (−𝑘𝑗𝑡))𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 ] × 𝑞𝑗; 
𝑗 = 2,… , 𝑛. 
In an equilibrium, all 𝐹𝑖
(1)
 and 𝐹𝑗
(2)
 are equal to zero. Because, if 𝑠𝑖  (𝑖 ≠ 1) 
is another strategy in the equilibrium, then 𝑢1(𝑠1, 𝑞) − 𝑢1(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑞) (or 
similarly [𝑢2(𝑝, 𝑠1) − 𝑢2(𝑝, 𝑠𝑖)]) is equal to zero. Otherwise, 𝑝𝑖 (or 
similarly 𝑞𝑗) is equal to zero.  
We define  𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞) =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐹1
(1)(𝑝, 𝑞)
𝐹2
(1)(𝑝, 𝑞)
⋮
𝐹𝑛
(1)(𝑝, 𝑞)
𝐹1
(2)(𝑝, 𝑞)
⋮
𝐹𝑛
(2)(𝑝, 𝑞)]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ; hence we have  
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𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝑃
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑝1
⋮
𝑑𝐹𝑛
(1)
𝑑𝑝1
𝑑𝐹1
(2)
𝑑𝑝1
⋮
𝑑𝐹𝑛
(2)
𝑑𝑝𝑛
 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑝2
⋮
…𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑝𝑛
…
 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑞1
⋯𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑞𝑛
⋮
𝑑𝐹𝑛
(1)
𝑑𝑞𝑛
𝑑𝐹1
(2)
𝑑𝑞𝑛
⋮
𝑑𝐹𝑛
(2)
𝑑𝑞𝑛 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2𝑛)×(2𝑛)
  
We should show that 
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝑃
≠ 0. 
We know that 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑝𝑖
= 1, 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑞𝑖
= 0. Similarly, we have 
𝑑𝐹1
(2)
𝑑𝑝𝑖
= 0, 
𝑑𝐹1
(2)
𝑑𝑞𝑖
= 1. 
For 𝑖 > 1 we have 
𝑑𝐹𝑖
(1)
𝑑𝑝𝑗
= {
∑ (𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗,
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.
 
𝑑𝐹𝑖
(1)
𝑑𝑞𝑗
=(𝑘1𝑗 − 𝑘𝑖𝑗) 𝑝𝑖 . 
 
𝑑𝐹𝑖
(2)
𝑑𝑝𝑗
= −(𝑘1𝑗 − 𝑘𝑖𝑗) 𝑞𝑖 .   
𝑑𝐹𝑖
(2)
𝑑𝑞𝑗
= {
∑ −(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗,
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.
 
Hence, by some elementary operations in 
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝑃
 , we can see that the rank of 
the matrix 
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝑃
 is equal to the rank of ?̿? = [
0
𝐶2
𝐶1
0
]
(2𝑛)×(2𝑛)
, where 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 
are computational matrix of Player 1 and Player 2, (Calculations are shown 
in Appendix A.4). By Theorem 2.13 we know that 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 have full rank, 
hence ?̅? has full rank as well and the equilibrium is regular in the sense of 
Harsanyi,∎. 
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Theorem 2. 15. In a symmetric zero-sum tournament game with the set of 
strategies {𝒔𝟏, 𝒔𝟐, … , 𝒔𝒏} and the matrix game 𝑲 = [
𝑺𝟏
⋮
𝑺𝒏
], if (𝑷,𝑷) 
(𝑷 = (𝒑𝟏, 𝒑𝟐, … , 𝒑𝒏)) is an equilibrium point, then for all the 𝒑𝒊 = 𝟎 we 
have 𝑺𝒊𝑷 < 𝟎. 
Proof: 
Assume that ?̅?𝑚×𝑚 ,𝑚 < 𝑛 is the largest positive subtournament of 𝐾. 
Hence, as ?̅? is a game matrix of a positive subtournament, then 𝑚 is odd. 
If ?̅? = (𝑝1̅̅ ̅, 𝑝2̅̅ ̅, … , 𝑝𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ) is the optimal strategy then we have  ?̅?𝑖?̅?
𝑇 = 0. If 
we add any bad quality strategy to ?̅?  (we call the new game matrix 
?̿?) then optimal strategy is ?̿? = (𝑝1̅̅ ̅, 𝑝2̅̅ ̅, … , 𝑝𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑝𝑚+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) where ?̅?𝑚+1 = 0. If 
we assume that 𝑆𝑚+1?̿? = 0, as a result we have ?̿??̿? = 0. ?̿? is a (𝑚 + 1) 
by (𝑚 + 1) matrix where (𝑚 + 1) is even. So, by Theorem 1.2.5 ?̿? has full 
rank, as a result ?̿? = 0, which is contradiction. Hence, 𝑆𝑖?̿? < 0. ∎ 
Corollary 2. 16. The equilibrium point in any symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game is regular. 
Proof:  
Let ?́? be the largest positive subtournament of 𝑇 where 𝐾 and ?́? are the 
matrix game of the tournaments 𝑇 and ?́?, respectively. By Theorem 2.14 
we know that the equilibrium in ?́? is regular and therefore, it will remain 
unique under small perturbation. On the other hand, by Theorem 2.14 we 
know that the expected pay off of a “bad quality” strategy of 𝐾 is strictly 
negative. Hence, by small changes in the matrix game it will remain 
negative. So, we can conclude that the equilibrium point in the symmetric 
zero-sum tournament game is robust under small perturbations, ∎. 
Corollary 2. 17. The equilibrium point of the symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game is robust under small perturbations. 
Proof: 
By Corollary 2. 15, we know that a symmetric zero-sum tournament game 
is regular. Hence it would be robust under small perturbations, ∎. 
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2.5 Generalized Hoteling-Downs model with Asymmetric 
Candidates 
In previous sections, I reviewed the main characteristics of the symmetric 
zero-sum games. I also, provide some theorems and explanations that 
how this game can be considered as the generalization of Hotelling-Downs 
model, when the strategy space of the candidates is not single-peaked.  
In this section, I make a perturbation on the main diagonal of the matrix 
game of the symmetric zero-sum tournament game. By this method, I 
extend the symmetric zero-sum tournament game to symmetric non zero-
sum tournament game and asymmetric zero-sum tournament game 
(tournament game with incumbent).  In this new version of the 
tournament games the tie situation has been resolved; and it can model 
different political situations.  
Definition 2. 18. Let 𝑻 be a symmetric zero-sum tournament game with 
matrix game 𝑲. The game with matrix game ?̅? = 𝑲 + 𝜶𝑰 for the first 
player and ?̅? = 𝑲𝑻 + 𝜶𝑰 for second player is called symmetric non zero-
sum tournament game; where 𝑰 is the identity matrix. 
Definition 2. 19. Let 𝑻 be a symmetric zero-sum tournament game with 
matrix game 𝑲. The zero-sum game with matrix game 𝑴 = 𝑲 +𝜶𝑰 is 
called asymmetric zero-sum tournament (tournament game with 
incumbent); where 𝑰 is the identity matrix. 
Theorem 2. 20. Let 𝑻 be a symmetric zero-sum tournament game with 
matrix game 𝑲. The equilibrium point of both symmetric non zero-sum 
tournament game and asymmetric zero-sum tournament games 
associated to the game matrix  𝑲  are unique for all 𝟎 < 𝜶 < 𝟏 and 𝒏 < 𝟕. 
Proof:  
I designed a computer algorithm with Maple which tests the uniqueness 
of the equilibrium point of all the symmetric non zero-sum and 
asymmetric zero-sum tournament games where  −1 < 𝛼 < 1 and 𝑛 ≤ 7, 
See Appendix A.5 for the Maple code. The computer program did not find 
any multiple equilibria.  
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2.5.1 Symmetric non zero-sum Tournament Game 
Symmetric non zero-sum tournament game, describes the situation where 
by selecting the same strategy both players have the same payoff which is 
not zero. In reality, it may happen when in a tie situation both players try 
to collaborate to increase/decrease their payoff. It means that this model 
can capture the cases when there is collusion between the parties, and 
they intentionally choose the same platform.  The incentive for avoiding 
the tie situation can also be created by an external party. The results in 
Section 2.4.2 guarantee that if the amount of the perturbation is small 
enough, the equilibrium point is unique. However, by some examples I 
demonstrate that under large perturbations the structure of the game 
varies considerably and the equilibrium point is not necessary unique. 
Example 2. 21. 
Suppose the matrix game of a symmetric zero sum tournament game as 
follow 
𝐾 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
−1
−1
1
1
1
−1
1
1
0
−1
−1
1
−1
−1
−1
1
1
0
−1
−1
−1
1
−1
−1
1
1
0
1
1
−1
1
−1
−1
1
−1
0
−1
1
1
−1
1
1
−1
1
0
−1
−1
1
1
−1
1
−1
1
0
−1
−1
1
1
−1
−1
1
1
0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . We can easily calculate that the optimal 
strategy is (
1
9
,
1
9
, 0,0,
1
3
,
1
9
,
1
3
, 0) for both players. 
We define a symmetric non zero-sum tournament game by following 
matrices, ?̅?1 = 𝐾 + 𝛼𝐼 and ?̅?2 = 𝐾
𝑇 + 𝛼𝐼, where 𝐼 is the identity matrix 
and 𝛼 ≠ 0. ?̅?1 is the game matrix for the first player and ?̅?2 is the game 
matrix for second one. In this game, the equilibrium is unique when 
0 < 𝛼 < 0.27789.  In this example both players have 8 strategies. As I 
explained in Theorem 2.24, there is no such this example for the games 
with less than 8 strategies. 
 
                                                             
9 𝛼 has been calculated by employing Gambit 13 to test different games. 
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2.5.2 Asymmetric zero-sum Tournament Game 
In this section, we resolve the tie situation by considering a higher chance 
of winning for the first player in selecting the same strategy. In this case, 
the main diagonal of game matrix of symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game changes to a strictly non negative number like 𝛼. The game is still a 
zero-sum game; however it is not symmetric any more. We can also call 
the asymmetric zero-sum tournament game, the tournament game with 
incumbent. As it can describe the political situations where there is an 
incumbent who has been in power previously. The effect of the 
incumbency has been analysed by many studies. M. C. Cummings (1966) 
analysed the data of US presidential elections from 1924 to 1964. His 
analyse showed that in those elections the incumbent has more chances 
to keep the power compared to the challenging party. In contrast, in some 
societies voters may like to change the party who is in power for a long 
time. R. Chacrabarti et al. (2005)  study about the Sabha elections in India 
show the anti-incumbency behaviour among the voters. In both cases, one 
of the parties will have more chances to win when they both have chosen 
the same platform. The following example demonstrates a tournament 
game with incumbent. In this example, we have calculated the range of 
the possible positive amount of changes for 𝛼 which keep the equilibrium 
unique. 
Example 2. 22.    
If we consider the matrix game of the symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game as 𝐾 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
−1
−1
−1
1
1
−1
1
0
−1
−1
1
−1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
−1
0
−1
−1
1
−1
−1
−1
1
0
1
1
−1
1
−1
1
−1
0
−1
1
−1
−1
−1
−1
1
0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
, then the equilibrium is unique when 
0 < 𝛼 < 1. 
If 𝛼 = 1, the game has two equilibrium points as follow, 
 
𝑃1 = {(
1
5
,
1
5
, 0,0,0,
2
5
,
1
5
) , (
1
5
,
1
5
, 0,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
, 0)} and  
𝑃2 = {(
1
5
,
1
5
, 0,
1
10
,
1
10
,
3
10
,
1
10
) , (
1
5
,
1
5
, 0,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
, 0)}.  
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As we see, in both equilibrium points Player 1 is mixing between even 
number of strategies; which is in contrast to the previous results in 
symmetric zero-sum tournament games. Beside, as we can observe in 
equilibrium point 𝑃1, not necessarily both players have the same bad 
quality strategies.10 
Remark 2.23. The fact that in symmetric zero-sum tournament game 
players  mix between odd number of strategies (Colloraly 2.9) coming 
from the fact that the game matrix of a symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game has full rank just when number of strategies  𝑛 are even (Theorem 
1.2.5) and otherwise rank 𝑛 − 1. In the latter case the system 𝐾𝑝 = 0, 
may have a nontrivial solution and hence an equilibrium. In the case of an 
asymmetric zero-sum tournament game and symmetric non zero-sum 
tournament game we show (Theorem 2.25) that the game matrix always 
has full rank. Hence the support of the equilibrium may vary to have an 
odd or even number of positive probabilities. 
 
2.6 Sufficient Condition for Uniqueness of the Equilibrium   
  As we observed in the Example 2.21 and Example 2.22 of the previous 
section, the equilibrium point of the symmetric non zer-sum tournament 
game and asymmetric zero-sum tournament game is not necessarily 
unique. However, in this section we provide sufficient condition for 
uniqueness of the equilibrium in both of the mentioned tournament 
games.  
Theorem 2. 23. If 𝑲 is the game matrix of symmetric zero sum tournament 
game then all the eigenvalues of 𝑲 are purely imaginary (Hoffman (1971)).  
Proof: 
We know that for the symmetric zero sum tournament game 𝐾𝑇 = −𝐾. 
Hence, we have 
𝐾𝑣 = 𝜆𝑣   ⇒  𝐾𝑣̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝜆𝑣̅̅ ̅    ⇒   𝐾?̅? = ?̅??̅?   , as the elements of 𝐾 are real. 
                                                             
10 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 have been calculated by “enumerating extreme points” method in Gambit 13. As the game is a 
zero-sum game, 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are the extreme points of a convex set of equilibrium points. 
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(𝐾𝑣 )̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇𝑣 = (?̅??̅? )
𝑇
 𝑣   ⇒  (?̅?)𝑇𝐾𝑇𝑣 = ?̅? (?̅? )𝑇  𝑣 ⇒   (?̅?)𝑇(−𝐾) 𝑣 =
?̅? (?̅? )𝑇  𝑣 ⇒  (?̅?)𝑇(−𝜆) 𝑣 = ?̅? (?̅? )𝑇  𝑣  ⇒  −𝜆 ‖𝑣‖2 = ?̅?‖𝑣‖2  ⇒    
Eigenvalues of 𝐾 are purely imaginary,∎. 
Theorem 2. 24. The matrix A with eigenvalues as 𝝀𝟏, … , 𝝀𝒏 and the 
eigenvectors as 𝒗𝟏, … , 𝒗𝒏 has the same eigenvectors as the matrix 
 𝛼𝑚𝐴
𝑚 + 𝛼𝑚−1𝐴
𝑚−1 +⋯+ 𝛼1𝐴 + 𝛼1 
but the eigenvalues of the latter will be 
 𝛼𝑚𝜆
𝑚 + 𝛼𝑚−1𝜆
𝑚−1 +⋯+ 𝛼1𝜆 + 𝛼1. (see Hoffman (1971)). 
By Theorem 2. 8 we know that the matrix game of a symmetric zero-sum 
game has full rank just when the number of the strategies are even. 
Following theorem explain the rank of the matrix game of an asymmetric 
zero-sum tournament game. 
Theorem 2. 25. Let 𝑲 be the matrix game of a symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game. If 𝑴 = 𝑲 +𝜶𝑰 (𝜶 ≠ 𝟎) then 𝑴 has full rank. 
Proof:  
By theorem 3.1.1 we know that all the eigenvalues of 𝐾 are in the form of 
𝑏𝑖, where 𝑏 is a real number and 𝑖 is the imaginary number. On the other 
hand, we know 𝑀 = 𝐾 + 𝛼𝐼 (𝛼 ≠ 0) where 𝐾 is the game matrix of 
symmetric zero sum tournament game. As a result by theorems 3.1.2 we 
know that all the eigenvalues of 𝑀 are in form of 𝑏𝑖 + 1. 𝑏𝑖 + 1 cannot be 
zero, so all the eigenvalues of 𝑀 are non- zero. Hence 𝑀 has full rank, ∎. 
Theorem 2. 26. Let 𝑲 be the game matrix of a symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game. If 𝑴 = 𝑲 +𝜶𝑰 (𝜶 ≠ 𝟎) the computational matrix of 𝑴 
has full rank. 
Proof: 
If we denote the row vectors of 𝑀 by 𝑎𝑖, we want to show that 
𝐶 = [
(1,1,… ,1)
𝑎2 − 𝑎1
⋮
𝑎𝑛−𝑎1
] has full rank. By Theorem 2.25 we know that 𝑀 has full 
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rank for 𝛼 ≠ 0. Hence 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎1 are linearly independent for 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛; 
which means that 
∑𝜆𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎1) = 0,
𝑛
𝑖=2
 
would imply 
−(∑𝜆𝑖)𝑎1 +
𝑛
𝑖=2
∑𝜆𝑖𝑎𝑖 = 0,
𝑛
𝑖=2
 
By linear independence of 𝑎𝑖 we obtain 𝜆2 = ⋯ = 𝜆𝑛 = 0. 
Suppose 𝐶 does not have full rank. Hence, the first row of 𝐶, ?́? =
(1,1, … ,1), is the non-trivial combination of other rows.  
?́? = ∑ 𝑝𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎1)
𝑛
𝑖=2 , 
with 𝑝𝑖0 ≠ 0 for some 2 ≤ 𝑖0 ≤ 𝑛. Suppose 𝑝1 = −∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=2 , hence we 
have 
?́? =∑𝑝𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎1)
𝑛
𝑖=2
=∑𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖 − (∑𝑝𝑖)𝑎1
𝑛
𝑖=2
=
𝑛
𝑖=2
𝑝1𝑎1 +∑𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖 =∑𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=2
 
whereby 
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 0, 
and 𝑝𝑖0 ≠ 0 for some 2 ≤ 𝑖0 ≤ 𝑛. 
We can write this in matrix notation as  
?́? = ?́?𝑀 and ?́?𝑝 = 0 
where ?́? = (𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑛) and ?́? ≠ 0.  
However, this leads to the following contradiction for 𝛼 ≠ 0.  
We know that ?́?𝐾𝑝 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ (𝑘𝑖𝑗 + 𝑘𝑗𝑖)𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑗>𝑖 = 0, as 𝐾 is a skew-
symmetric matrix. 
0 = ?́?𝑝 = ?́?𝑀𝑝 = ?́?(𝐾 + 𝛼𝐼)𝑝 = ?́?𝐾𝑝 + 𝛼?́?𝐼𝑝 = 0 + 𝛼∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ≠ 0, 
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where by 𝐼 we denotes the identity matrix.  Hence, 𝐶 must have full rank, 
∎. 
Theorem 2. 27. Let 𝑲 be a matrix game of a symmetric zero-sum game. In 
an asymmetric zero-sum tournament game where the matrix game is 
𝑴 = 𝑲+ 𝜶𝑰 and 𝜶 ≠ 𝟎, in equilibrium, when one player plays with a full 
support mixed strategy the other player has a unique optimal strategy.  
Proof: 
By applying Theorem 2.26, we can show that in an asymmetric zero-sum 
tournament game the computational matrices of the game matrix of first 
and second player have full rank when 𝛼 ≠ 0. It means that when one of 
the players mixes between all of his strategies with positive probability, 
the computational system for calculating the optimal strategies of the 
other player have to have a unique solution, ∎. 
Theorem 2.28. In Symmetric non zero-sum tournament games, in 
equilibrium, when one player plays with a full support mixed strategy the 
other player has a unique optimal strategy. 
Proof: 
The proof is the same of Theorem 2.28, ∎.  
 In fact, Theorem 2.28 and Theorem 2.29 provide sufficient condition for 
uniqueness of the equilibrium.  
 
2.7 Regular Tournament Game in the sense of Laffond et al. 
In previous sections we saw that for a symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game the value is zero. However there is no theorem to provide the 
amount of the value for asymmetric zero-sum tournament game. For 
different number of strategies we may have different games with different 
values. In this section we first provide an example to show how the 
amount of the values can be different for the asymmetric zero-sum 
tournament games with the same number of strategies. Later, I will 
analyse the special case of regular tournaments in sense of Laffond et al. 
where not only we can predict the amount of the value also we can 
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guarantee the unique, uniform distribution optimal strategy for both 
players. 
Example 2. 29.  
Let 𝐾𝑛×𝑛 be a matrix game of a symmetric zero-sum tournament game 
with 𝑛 strategies. Suppose the asymmetric zero-sum tournament game 
with matrix game 𝑀 = 𝐾 + 𝐼 and 𝑛 number of strategies. Following table 
shows the possible values of the value of the game, for different number 
of strategies. 
𝒏 Value 
 
3 {1,1/3} 
4 {1,1/3} 
 
5 {1,
1
3
,
1
4
,
1
5
 } 
6 
{1,
1
3
,
1
4
,
1
5
 } 
7 
{1,
1
3
,
1
4
,
1
5
,
1
6
,
1
7
,
2
11
,
3
13
,
3
17
 } 
8 
{1,
1
3
,
1
4
,
1
5
,
1
6
,
1
7
,
2
11
,
3
13
,
3
17
,
3
19
,
5
21
,
5
29
,
5
31
,
5
33
,
7
41
,
7
45
 } 
  
Table 2. 5. Possible amount of the value of the asymmetric zero-sum tournament game for 𝜶 = 𝟏. 
Definition 2. 29. A symmetric zero-sum tournament is regular in the sense 
of Laffond et al if all its vertices have similar score. 
Theorem 2. 30.  A symmetric zero-sum tournament is regular if and only if 
in the equilibrium players mixes between all the strategies with uniform 
distribution. 
Proof: 
Suppose that 𝐾 is the matrix game of a symmetric zero-sum tournament 
game. If we suppose that the all the vertices have similar score, then 
obviously players will be indifferent between all the strategies. 
On the other hand, in equilibrium players are mixing between the 
strategies with the uniform strategy 𝑃 = (𝑝, 𝑝, … , 𝑝). Hence we will have 
𝐾𝑃𝑇 = [0]𝑛×1; which means that 𝐾[1]𝑛×1 = [0]𝑛×1. So, in each row of 𝐾 
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we should have equal number of 1 and −1. This means that the score of 
all vertices in the tournament game is equal, ∎.  
Following theorem explain the optimal strategy and value of the game for 
the regular asymmetric zero-sum games. 
Theorem 2. 31. Let 𝑻 be a symmetric zero-sum tournament game with the 
game matrix 𝑲, and ?̅? an asymmetric zero-sum tournament game with 
game matrix ?̅̅̅? = 𝑲 + 𝜶𝑰, 𝜶 ≠ 𝟎. In the equilibrium, in the tournament 
game 𝑻 players are mixing between all of the strategies uniformly if and 
only if the players in the tournament game ?̅? do the same. 
Besides, in this case the value for the asymmetric zero-sum tournament 
game ?̅? would be 
𝛼
𝑛
 , where 𝑛 is the number of the strategies. 
Proof: 
Suppose that in the tournament game ?̅?, players mix between all of the 
strategies uniformly. 
Let  𝐸 = [
1 1…1
𝑒1
⋮
𝑒𝑛−1
] and ?̅? = [
1 1…1
?̅?1
⋮
?̅?𝑛−1
] be the computational matrices of 𝐾 
and ?̅?, respectively. In each ?̅?𝑖 we have “-1-𝛼 and 𝛼-1”  or “1- 𝛼 and 𝛼 +1”. 
Hence, as players are mixing between all the strategies uniformly the 
computational system  ?̅?𝑞 = [
1
⋮
0
0
], will have the same answer as  
computational system 𝐸𝑞 = [
1
⋮
0
0
].  
Suppose that in the tournament game 𝑇, players mix between all of the 
strategies uniformly. If 𝑞 is the unique optimal strategy then it would be 
the solution of following computational system, 𝐸 [
1 1…1
𝑒1
⋮
𝑒𝑛−1
] 𝑞 = [
1
⋮
0
0
]. We 
add a -𝛼 to the the first element and an 𝛼 to the 𝑖 + 1th element of 𝑒𝑖. So, 
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the system will change to ?̅? [
1 1…1
?̅?1
⋮
?̅?𝑛−1
] 𝑞 = [
1
⋮
0
0
], where the solution has 
been not changed. 
Hence, tournament games 𝑇 and ?̅? have the same optimal solutions. As a 
result, the value for ?̅? would be 
𝛼
𝑛
 where 𝑛 is the number of the 
strategies,∎. 
Example 2. 32. For the regular symmetric zero-sum tournament game 
with matrix game   
𝐾 =
 
, the optimal strategy for both players is 
{
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
}.  
 
In the asymmetric zero-sum tournament game with matrix game 
?̅? = 𝐾 + 𝛼𝐼, 𝛼 ≠ 0 the optimal strategy for both players is {
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
} 
and the value of the game is 
𝛼
5
 . 
Corollary 2. 33. Let 𝑻 be a symmetric zero-sum tournament game with 
matrix game 𝑲 and ?̅? be an asymmetric zero-sum tournament game with 
matrix game ?̅? = 𝑲 + 𝜶𝑰, 𝜶 ≠ 𝟎.  
In tournament game ?̅?, in the equilibrium players cannot mix between all 
of their strategies uniformly when the number of the strategies are even. 
Proof: 
We know that in the tournament game 𝑇, in the equilibrium players are 
mixing between odd number of the strategies. Hence, they cannot have 
the uniform full support optimal strategies. As a result by Theorem 1, 
players in tournament game ?̅? cannot have uniform full support 
equilibrium point as well.   
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2.8 Conclusion 
I analyse the tournament game (named as symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game in this study). Previous results have shown that it has a 
unique solution; I demonstrate that the uniqueness is robust under small 
perturbation. However, the structure of the solution changes significantly 
when the amount of perturbation is greater than a certain threshold 
dependent on each game. I analyse the tournament game with incumbent 
as the case of a perturbed tournament game. By providing several 
examples I show that the structure of the equilibrium point is 
fundamentally different from the standard tournament game. While there 
is no general criteria to describe the value and optimal strategies of the 
game I provide a partial criteria which is a sufficient condition for 
uniqueness of equilibrium. This work enables future studies on 
determining the threshold of perturbations and general criteria for 
optimal strategies in perturbed games. 
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A. Appendix to Chapter 2 
This appendix provides mathematical background for the models and 
theorems in this chapter. 
 
A.1. Graphs and Subgraphs 
Graphs are the structures that connect some set of vertices with some 
specific rules. Despite the simple structures graphs have wide application 
in mathematical modelling.    
In this Appendix, the concepts and definitions of graphs and subgraphs 
used in the models and theorems of this study are explained, (See 
Trudeau (2013)).  
Definition A. 1. 1. A graph 𝐺 consists of two sets. First a non-empty set 
𝑉(𝐺) (set of vertices) and secondly, 𝐸(𝐺)  (set of edges).  
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Following example shows a simple graph with four vertices and three 
edges.  
Example A. 1. 2. 
𝑉(𝐺) = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4}, 𝐸(𝐺) = {𝑣1𝑣2, 𝑣2𝑣3, 𝑣3𝑣4}. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A. 1. 3. A simple graph with four vertices and three edges 
Definition A. 1. 4. A directed graph 𝐷 consists of two sets. First a non-
empty set 𝑉(𝐷) (set of vertices) and secondly a finite set of ordered pair 
of elements of 𝐷 (𝐴(𝐷)), each ordered pair is called arc.  
Following example shows a simple directed graph with four vertices and 
three arcs.  
 
Example A. 1. 5. 
𝑉(𝐷) = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4}, 𝐴(𝐷) = {𝑣1𝑣2, 𝑣2𝑣3, 𝑣3𝑣4}. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A. 1. 6. A simple graph with four vertices and three edges 
Definition A. 1. 6. In a directed graph like 𝐷, two vertices like 𝑣1, 𝑣2 are 
adjacent if 𝑣1𝑣2𝜖𝐴(𝐷). 
Definition A. 1. 7. In a directed graph like 𝐷, there is a path from vertex 𝑣1 
to 𝑣𝑛 ,if there is a finite sequence of arcs of the form 
𝑣1𝑣2, 𝑣2𝑣3, … , 𝑣𝑛−1𝑣𝑛 between 𝑣1 and 𝑣𝑛.  
Definition A. 1. 8. In a directed graph like 𝐷, there is a path with the 
length of  𝑚 from vertex 𝑣1 to 𝑣𝑛 if the shortest path between 𝑣1 to 𝑣𝑛 
has exactly 𝑚 arcs. 
𝑣1 𝑣2 
𝑣4 𝑣3 
 
𝑣2 
𝑣4 𝑣3 
𝑣1 
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Definition A. 1. 9. A directed graph like 𝐷 has a cycle, if we can find a path 
starting from a vertex like 𝑣1 and ending to 𝑣1 with the length of |𝑉(𝐺)|. 
Example A. 1. 10. 
𝑉(𝐷) = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4}, 𝐴(𝐷) = {𝑣1𝑣2, 𝑣2𝑣3, 𝑣3𝑣4, 𝑣4𝑣1, 𝑣3𝑣1}. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- There is a path of length two between 𝑣1 and 𝑣3 (𝑣1𝑣2, 𝑣2𝑣3). 
- The graph has a cycle (𝑣1𝑣2, 𝑣2𝑣3, 𝑣3𝑣4, 𝑣4𝑣1). 
 
Figure A. 1. 11. A simple directed graph with four vertices and four edges 
Definition A. 1. 11. A directed graph ?̅? is a subgraph of directed graph 𝐷, 
if  𝑉(?̅?) ⊆ 𝑉(𝐷) and 𝐴(?̅?) ⊆ 𝐴(𝐷). 
A.2. Zero-sum games 
In this appendix, I review the definition and characteristics of the zero-
sum games which is the base of the model in Section 2. In this appendix, 
the notations and definitions are the same of Maschler, Solan and Zamir 
(2013). 
Definition A. 2. 1. A two player game is a zero-sum game if for each pair of 
strategies (𝑠𝐼 , 𝑠𝐼𝐼) one has 
𝑢𝐼(𝑠𝐼 , 𝑠𝐼𝐼) + 𝑢𝐼𝐼(𝑠𝐼 , 𝑠𝐼𝐼) = 0. 
Where 𝑢𝐼 and 𝑢𝐼𝐼 are the utility functions of the first and second player. 
Typically, the concepts of maxmin and minmax strategy are useful in 
analysing the zero-sum games. 
Maxmin value is the value that first player guarantees that he will get, and 
minmax value is the value that second player guarantees he will lose no 
more than. For a zero-sum game the maxmin and minmax values can be 
found by following equations 
𝑣 = max
𝑠𝐼𝜖𝑆𝐼
min
𝑠𝐼𝐼𝜖𝑆𝐼𝐼
𝑢(𝑠𝐼 , 𝑠𝐼𝐼), 
𝑣1 
𝑣2 
𝑣3 𝑣4 
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𝑣 = min
𝑠𝐼𝐼𝜖𝑆𝐼𝐼
max
𝑠𝐼𝜖𝑆𝐼
𝑢(𝑠𝐼 , 𝑠𝐼𝐼), 
where 𝑢𝐼 = −𝑢𝐼𝐼 = 𝑢 and 𝑆𝐼 and 𝑆𝐼𝐼 are the set of strategies for first and 
second player respectively. For zero-sum games, maxmin and minmax 
values are equal (𝑣 = 𝑣 = 𝑣), where 𝑣 is called value of the game. Any 
maxmin and minmax strategies of the game are called optimal strategy.   
Maxmin strategies and Nash equilibrium are two different concepts. 
However, for the case of zero-sum games they are equivalent. 
 
 
 
 
 
A.3 Calculating Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Games 
There are some theorems which can predict the value and optimal 
strategies of certain zero-sum games. However, here I briefly review two 
different methods for calculating the optimal strategies of a zero-sum 
game.  
 A.3.1 Indifferent Strategies 
In a mixed strategy equilibrium for a zero-sum game, we know that a 
player will mix between two (or more) strategies if he is indifferent 
between them. If we know that the player is mixing between all of his 
strategies, we can use this fact to find the optimal strategies.  
Suppose a zero-sum game ?̅? with two players. The matrix game of the 
game can be denoted as 𝐺 = (𝑔𝑖𝑗)𝑛×𝑛 = [
𝑎1
⋮
𝑎𝑛
]. 
If Player 1, mixes between all of his strategies then we can find the 
optimal strategies for second player by solving the following system   
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𝐶1𝑞 = [
1
0
⋮
0
]
𝑛×1
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑞 ≥ 0, 𝑞 = (𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑛);              (A.3.1.1) 
where 𝐶1 = [
(1,… ,1)
𝑎2 − 𝑎1
⋮
𝑎𝑛 − 𝑎1
].   
Similarly, if second player mixes between all of his strategies then we can 
find the optimal strategies of first player by solving the following system 
𝐶2𝑝 = [
1
0
⋮
0
]
𝑛×1
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝 ≥ 0, 𝑝 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛);         (A.3.1.2) 
where −𝐺 = [
𝑏1
⋮
𝑏𝑛
] and 𝐶2 = [
(1,… ,1)
𝑏2 − 𝑏1
⋮
𝑏𝑛 − 𝑏1
].   
This is not an efficient method to find all of the equilibriums of a zero-sum 
game. Obviously, there might be some equilibriums that a player is not 
mixing between all of his strategies. 
A.3.2  Linear Programing  
Luce and Raiffa (1957) introduced a linear programing system to calculate 
the optimal strategies of a zero-sum game. In comparison with Indifferent 
strategies method described in A.3.1, this method is computationally 
more costly. However, it is more efficient as it can calculate all of the 
optimal strategies of a player. 
For a zero-sum game with matrix game 𝐺 = (𝑔𝑖𝑗)𝑛×𝑛, the following 
system can give us all the possible optimal strategies (minmax strategies) 
for Player 1. 
{
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣
(𝐺𝑇𝑥)𝑗 ≥ 𝑣    ∀𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0.
                                                                                 (A.3.2.1) 
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To change System (A.3.2.1) to a LP program, initially we add a large 
enough positive number to all the entries of 𝐺 to make them all positive. 
 ∃𝑎 > 0; ?́? = (𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝑎)𝑛×𝑛 ⇒ ?́? > 0. 
If we rewrite System (A.3.2.1) for the new matrix, ?́?, we have 
{
 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣
(?́?𝑇𝑥)𝑗 ≥ 𝑣    ∀𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0.
                                                                                (A.3.2.2) 
By solving the system (A.3.2.2) we can find optimal strategies. However, 
the calculated value in (A.3.2.2) is the value of the game with matrix game 
𝐺, added by 𝑎. we denote the new value by 𝑣∗. We know that as ?́? > 0 
then 𝑣∗ > 0. Hence, as 𝑣∗ > 0, then by letting 
𝑥𝑖
𝑣∗
= 𝑢𝑖 and dividing 
∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗́  𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑣
∗𝑛
𝑖=1  to 𝑣
∗ the system (A.3.2.2) changes to 
{
 
 
min∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1   
(?́?𝑇𝑢)𝑗 ≥ 1, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗
𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0.
                                                                      (A.3.2.3). 
By solving the LP system (A.3.2.3), we can find all the optimal strategies of 
the first player. 
Similarly we can find optimal strategies for the second player by solving 
the following problem.  
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣
∑−𝐺𝑞
𝑛
𝑖=1
≥ 𝑣
∑𝑞𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑖 ≥ 0.
⇒
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 ?́?
∑𝐺𝑞
𝑛
𝑖=1
≤ ?́?
∑𝑞𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑖 ≥ 0.
 ⇒
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑣∗
∑?́?𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≤ 𝑣∗
∑𝑞𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑖 ≥ 0.
 ⇒ 
(A.3.2.4)                  (A.3.2.5)                   (A.3.2.6) 
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(𝑏𝑦  
𝑞𝑖
𝑣∗
= 𝑣𝑖)  
{
  
 
  
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∑𝑣𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑?́?𝑣𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≤ 1
𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0.
 
(A.3.2.7). 
LP Systems (A.3.2.3) and (A.3.2.7) are dual. 
 
 
 
 
 
A. 4 Regular Equilibrium  
In this appendix, I briefly review the concept of the regular equilibrium in 
the sense of Harsanyi (1973). Later, I provide the detailed calculation of 
the Theorem 2. 14, which investigates the regular equilibrium in 
perturbed asymmetric zero-sum games. 
A.4.1. Regular equilibria in normal form games 
The concept of regular equilibria is defined by Harsanyi (1973) to do more 
refinements with the concept of Nash equilibrium. In this section I review 
the concept of regular equilibrium for finite normal form games. For this 
matter I follow the definitions and notations by Van Damme (1991), which 
are slightly different from the definitions given by Harsanyi (1973). 
However, with both definitions we can conclude the strong stability 
characteristics. 
In this section, first I provide the definition of the 𝑛-person normal form 
game, and then I provide some notations and formulations needed to 
introduce the regular equilibrium. 
Definition A. 4. 1. A finite 𝑛-person normal form game is a 2𝑛-tuple 
Γ(Φ1, Φ2, … ,Φ𝑛, 𝑅1, … , 𝑅𝑛) where  Φ𝑖 is a finite non-empty set and 𝑅𝑖 is a 
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mapping 𝑅𝑖:∏ Φ𝑗 → ℛ
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  Φ𝑖 is the set of pure strategies of the player 𝑖, 
and 𝑅𝑖 is the payoff function of this player.  
We also define 𝑚𝑖 = |Φ𝑖|. The generic element of Φ𝑖 is denoted by 𝜙𝑖. 
We also assumed that the elements of Φ𝑖 are numbered, hence we can 
talk about the 𝑘𝑡ℎ pure strategy of player 𝑖. So, the generic element of Φ𝑖 
can also be denoted by 𝑘.  
A mixed strategy 𝑠𝑖  of player 𝑖 is a probability distribution on Φ𝑖. I denote 
the probability which 𝑠𝑖  assigns to pure strategy 𝑘 of player 𝑖 by 𝑠𝑖
𝑘 . 
Hence, the set of all mixed strategies of player 𝑖 is  
𝑆𝑖 = {𝑠𝑖𝜖𝑓(Φ𝑖 , 𝑅); ∑𝑠𝑖
𝑘 = 1,
𝑘
𝑠𝑖
𝑘 ≥ 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝜖Φ𝑖}. 
If 𝑠𝑖𝜖𝑆𝑖  then we define 𝐶(𝑠𝑖) as follows 
𝐶(𝑠𝑖) = {𝑘𝜖Φ𝑖;  𝑠𝑖
𝑘 > 0}. 
Φ and 𝑆 are defined as follow.  
Φ =∏Φ𝑖  
𝑛
𝑖=1
, 𝑆 =∏𝑆𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
.   
A generic element of Φ is denoted by 𝜙. So, we can define 𝐶(𝑠) as 
𝐶(𝑠) = {𝜙; 𝑠(𝜙) > 0} =∏𝐶(𝑠𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
. 
In a finite normal form game, players choose their strategy independently, 
therefore the probability 𝑠(𝜙) that 𝜙 = (𝑘1, . . , 𝑘𝑛) occurs if 𝑠 =
(𝑠1, . . , 𝑠𝑛) is played, is given by 
𝑠(𝜙) = ∏ 𝑠𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
Hence if 𝑠 is played, the expected payoff of player 𝑖 is 
𝑅𝑖(𝑠) =∑𝑠(𝜙)𝑅𝑖(𝜙).
𝜙
 
If 𝑠 = (𝑠1, . . , 𝑠𝑛) then  𝑠\?̅?𝑖  means replacing strategy 𝑠𝑖  with ?̅?𝑖 .   
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Let Γ(Φ1, Φ2, … ,Φ𝑛 , 𝑅1, … , 𝑅𝑛) be an 𝑛-person normal form game. 𝑋𝑖 is 
the set of all mappings from Φ𝑖 to ℛ and we have 𝑆𝑖 ⊂ 𝑋𝑖. The generic 
element of 𝑋𝑖 is denoted by 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖
𝑘  denotes value of 𝑥𝑖  at 𝑘. Besides, 
𝑋 = ∏ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  and generic element of 𝑋 is 𝑥. 
We define 𝑅𝑖 as follows 
𝑅𝑖(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥(𝜙)𝑅𝑖(𝜙)𝜙𝜖Φ ; 𝑥(𝜙) = ∏ 𝑥𝑗
𝑘𝑗𝑛
𝑗=1  if 𝜙 = (𝑘1, … , 𝑘𝑛). 
Let 𝐹(𝑥|𝜙) be a mapping defined precisely as follow 
𝐹𝑖
𝑘(𝑥|𝜙) = 𝑥𝑖
𝑘(𝑅𝑖(𝑥|𝑘) − 𝑅𝑖(𝑥|𝑘𝑖)) for 𝑖𝜖𝑁, 𝑘𝜖Φ𝑖 , 𝑘 ≠ 𝑘𝑖, 
𝐹𝑖
𝑘𝑖(𝑥|𝜙) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑘
𝑘 − 1  for 𝑖𝜖𝑁. Then Jacobian matrix is 𝐽(𝑠|𝜙) =
𝜕𝐹(𝑥|𝜙)
𝜕𝑥
|𝑥=𝑠 . 
We can easily see that if 𝑠 is an equilibrium of Γ with 𝜙𝜖𝐶(𝑠), then 
𝐹(𝑠|𝜙) = 0. Hence, we can expect that the Jacobian matrix may have also 
some nice properties (such as being locally invertible). Following definition 
employed the Jacobian matrix to define the regular equilibrium. 
Definition A. 4. 2. An equilibrium 𝑠 of Γ is a regular equilibrium if 𝐽(𝑠|𝜑) is 
nonsingular for some 𝜑𝜖𝐶(𝑠). 
Theorem A. 4. 3. Every regular equilibrium is strongly stable. 
Strongly stable equilibrium means that by small perturbation in the data 
of the game, the equilibrium will not change.   
A.4.2. Calculations of Theorem 2.14. 
As we see in proof of the Theorem 2.14 of section 2.4.2  
We define  𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞) =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐹1
(1)(𝑝, 𝑞)
𝐹2
(1)(𝑝, 𝑞)
⋮
𝐹𝑛
(1)(𝑝, 𝑞)
𝐹1
(2)(𝑝, 𝑞)
⋮
𝐹𝑛
(2)(𝑝, 𝑞)]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ; where  
𝐹1
(1)
= ∑ 𝑝𝑖 − 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 𝐹1
(2)
= ∑ 𝑞𝑖 − 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
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𝐹𝑖
(1) = [𝑢1(𝑠1, 𝑞) − 𝑢1(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑞)] × 𝑝𝑖 = [∑ (𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 ] × 𝑝𝑖; 
𝑖 = 2,… , 𝑛. 
𝐹𝑗
(2) = [𝑢2(𝑠1, 𝑝) − 𝑢2(𝑠𝑗 , 𝑝)] × 𝑞𝑗 = [∑ ((−𝑘1𝑡) − (−𝑘𝑗𝑡))𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 ] × 𝑞𝑗; 
𝑗 = 2,… , 𝑛. 
Hence, we have  
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝑃
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑝1
⋮
𝑑𝐹𝑛
(1)
𝑑𝑝1
𝑑𝐹1
(2)
𝑑𝑝1
⋮
𝑑𝐹𝑛
(2)
𝑑𝑝𝑛
 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑝2
⋮
…𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑝𝑛
…
 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑞1
⋯𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑞𝑛
⋮
𝑑𝐹𝑛
(1)
𝑑𝑞𝑛
𝑑𝐹1
(2)
𝑑𝑞𝑛
⋮
𝑑𝐹𝑛
(2)
𝑑𝑞𝑛 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2𝑛)×(2𝑛)
  
We know that 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑝𝑖
= 1, 
𝑑𝐹1
(1)
𝑑𝑞𝑖
= 0. Similarly, we have 
𝑑𝐹1
(2)
𝑑𝑝𝑖
= 0, 
𝑑𝐹1
(2)
𝑑𝑞𝑖
= 1. 
For 𝑖 > 1 we have 
𝑑𝐹𝑖
(1)
𝑑𝑝𝑗
= {
∑ (𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗,
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.
 
𝑑𝐹𝑖
(1)
𝑑𝑞𝑗
=(𝑘1𝑗 − 𝑘𝑖𝑗) 𝑝𝑖 . 
 
𝑑𝐹𝑖
(2)
𝑑𝑝𝑗
= −(𝑘1𝑗 − 𝑘𝑖𝑗) 𝑞𝑖 .   
𝑑𝐹𝑖
(2)
𝑑𝑞𝑗
= {
∑ −(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗,
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.
 
 
Hence, 
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝑃
= [
𝐴 𝐵
𝐶 𝐷
] where 
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𝐴 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 (𝑘1𝑡
𝐸1𝑘2𝑡)𝑞𝑡
0
0
⋮
0
1
∑(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘2𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
0
⋮
0
1
0
∑(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘2𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
⋮
0
…
0
∑(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘2𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
⋮
0
1
0
⋮
∑(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘2𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐵 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0
(𝑘11−𝑘21)𝑝2
(𝑘11−𝑘31)𝑝3
⋮
(𝑘11−𝑘𝑛1)𝑝𝑛
0
     (𝑘12−𝑘22)𝑝2
     (𝑘12−𝑘31)𝑝3
⋮
      (𝑘12−𝑘𝑛2)𝑝𝑛
 
0
   (𝑘13−𝑘23)𝑝2
   (𝑘13−𝑘33)𝑝3
⋮
   (𝑘13−𝑘𝑛3)𝑝𝑛
⋯
⋮
…
0
(𝑘1𝑛−𝑘2𝑛)𝑝2
(𝑘1𝑛−𝑘3𝑛)𝑝3
⋮
(𝑘1𝑛−𝑘𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐶 = −
[
 
 
 
 
 
0
(𝑘11−𝑘21)𝑞2
(𝑘11−𝑘31)𝑞3
⋮
(𝑘11−𝑘𝑛1)𝑞𝑛
0
     (𝑘12−𝑘22)𝑞2
     (𝑘12−𝑘31)𝑞3
⋮
      (𝑘12−𝑘𝑛2)𝑞𝑛
 
0
   (𝑘13−𝑘23)𝑞2
   (𝑘13−𝑘33)𝑞3
⋮
   (𝑘13−𝑘𝑛3)𝑞𝑛
⋯
⋮
…
0
(𝑘1𝑛−𝑘2𝑛)𝑞2
(𝑘1𝑛−𝑘3𝑛)𝑞3
⋮
(𝑘1𝑛−𝑘𝑛𝑛)𝑞𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐷 = −
[
 
 
 
 
 
 (𝑘1𝑡
𝐸1𝑘2𝑡)𝑞𝑡
0
0
⋮
0
1
∑(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘2𝑡)𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
0
⋮
0
1
0
∑(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘3𝑡)𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
⋮
0
…
0
∑(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘2𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
⋮
0
1
0
⋮
∑(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑛𝑡)𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In equilibrium, ∑ (𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑞𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1  and ∑ −(𝑘1𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑝𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1  are zero. 
Hence, in equilibrium  
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝑃
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
0
⋮
0
−(𝑘11 − 𝑘21)𝑞2
⋮
−(𝑘11 − 𝑘𝑛1)𝑞𝑛
1
0
…
…
…
…
…
1
0
⋮
0
−(𝑘1𝑛 − 𝑘2𝑛)𝑞2
⋮
−(𝑘1𝑛 − 𝑘𝑛𝑛)𝑞𝑛
0
(𝑘11 − 𝑘21)𝑝2
⋮
(𝑘11 − 𝑘𝑛1)𝑝𝑛
1
0
⋮
0
0
1
0
0
…
…
…
…
0
(𝑘1𝑛 − 𝑘2𝑛)𝑝2
⋮
(𝑘1𝑛 − 𝑘𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑛
1
0
⋮
0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If change the first row and (𝑛 + 1)th row, then we have matrix ?̅? which 
has a similar rank to 
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝑃
. On the other hand, we can see that  
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?̅? =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0
⋮
1
−(𝑘11 − 𝑘21)𝑞2
⋮
−(𝑘11 − 𝑘𝑛1)𝑞𝑛
0
1
…
…
…
…
…
0
0
⋮
1
−(𝑘1𝑛 − 𝑘2𝑛)𝑞2
⋮
−(𝑘1𝑛 − 𝑘𝑛𝑛)𝑞𝑛
1
(𝑘11 − 𝑘21)𝑝2
⋮
(𝑘11 − 𝑘𝑛1)𝑝𝑛
0
0
⋮
0
1
0
0
0
…
…
…
…
1
(𝑘1𝑛 − 𝑘2𝑛)𝑝2
⋮
(𝑘1𝑛 − 𝑘𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑛
0
0
⋮
0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
We know that 𝑝𝑖 > 0 and 𝑞𝑗 > 0. If we divide the 𝑖th row to  𝑝𝑖 where 
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 and to 𝑞𝑖 where  𝑛 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 2𝑛, then we will have ?̿? which has 
a similar rank to ?̅?. On the other hand, ?̿? = [
0
𝐶2
𝐶1
0
]
(2𝑛)×(2𝑛)
, where 𝐶1 is 
the computational matrix of 𝐾 and 𝐶2 computational matrix of -𝐾. By 
Theorem 2.13 we know that both 𝐶1 and  𝐶2 have full rank.  Hence, ?̿? have 
full rank. 
 
A.5 Maple Code for Computing the Equilibrium point in 
Tournament Games 
Following Maple code has been designed to receive the number of 
strategies and 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1, to calculate optimal strategies of the 
asymmetric zero-sum tournament game and symmetric zero-sum 
tournament game with matrix game 𝑀 = 𝐾 + 𝐼. Optimal strategies can be 
calculated by linear programing method (LP_method_maxmin ) or making 
all the strategies indifferent (Indifference_row). There is also couple of 
other modules which can test different characteristic of the equilibrium 
point.  full_support test if the optimal strategy has full support and 
Uniform_dis test if the optimal strategy has uniform distribution. 
 
> restart; 
with(LinearAlgebra): 
with(Optimization): 
with(simplex): 
>  
Matrices:=proc(a,t) 
global C,B,N,N2; 
local A,i,j,temp2,check,count3,s; 
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##for i from 1 to (2^N2) do 
B[t]:=Matrix(N): 
##end do: 
A:=Matrix(N): 
C:=Matrix(N): 
 
##for t from 1 to (2^N2) do 
#print(t); 
 
temp2:=0; 
while temp2=0 do 
 
A:=RandomMatrix(N,N,generator=0..1,shape=triangular[upper])
: 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
 for j from 1 to N do 
 B[t][i,j]:=A[i,j];   
 end do: 
end do: 
 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
 for j from 1 to N do 
  if i<j and B[t][i,j]=0 then B[t][i,j]:=-1; end if: 
  if i<j and B[t][i,j]=1 then B[t][i,j]:=1; end if: 
  if i=j then B[t][i,j]:=a; end if; 
  if i<j then B[t][j,i]:=(-1)*B[t][i,j] end if;    
 end do: 
end do: 
 
check:=0; 
for s from 1 to t-1 while check=0 do 
 
count3:=0;  
for i from 1 to N do 
 for j from 1 to N do 
  if s<>t and B[t][i,j]=B[s][i,j] then count3:=count3+1; 
end if:  
 end do: 
end do: 
###print("Comparison with",s,t,count3); 
if count3=N*N then check:=1; end if; 
end do: ###end of checking 
 
if check=1 and t>1 then temp2:=0; else temp2:=1; end if; 
 
end do; ###end of while loop 
###print(t,B[t],Determinant(B[t])); 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
 for j from 1 to N do 
  C[i,j]:=B[t][i,j]; 
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 end do: 
end do: 
 
 
end proc: 
 
################################### 
 
> Indifference_row:=proc(A) 
global q,D1,Equ; 
local Equ_b,i,j; 
 
Equ:=Matrix(N): 
 
Equ_b:=Matrix(N,1): 
Equ_b[1,1]:=1; 
for i from 2 to N do 
 Equ_b[i,1]:=0; 
end do: 
 
##print(Equ_b,"RHS"); 
q:=Matrix(N,1): 
 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
 Equ[1,i]:=1; 
end do: 
 
for i from 2 to N do 
for j from 1 to N do 
 Equ[i,j]:=-(A[i,j]-A[1,j]); 
end do: 
end do: 
 
###print(Equ); 
##print(Rank(Equ)); 
D1:=Determinant(Equ); 
q:=LinearSolve(Equ,Equ_b); 
##print("probability",q); 
 
 
end proc: 
 
######################## 
 
> LP_method_maxmin:=proc(A) 
global Y; 
local i,j,q,A1,Equ,cnsts,obj,set1; 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
 for j from 1 to N do 
  A1[i,j]:=A[i,j]; 
 end do: 
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end do: 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
 for j from 1 to N do 
  A1[i,j]:=A1[i,j]+2; 
 end do: 
end do: 
 
 
Equ:=Matrix(N+1); 
 
for i from 1 to N+1 do 
 for j from 1 to N+1 do 
 if i<N+1 and j<N+1 then Equ[i,j]:=A1[i,j]; end if; 
 if i=N+1 and j<N+1 then Equ[i,j]:=-1; end if; 
 if i<N+1 and j=N+1 then Equ[i,j]:=-1; end if; 
 if i=N+1 and j=N+1 then Equ[i,j]:=0; end if; 
 
 end do: 
end do: 
 
##print(Equ); 
 
for i from 1 to N+1 do 
q[i]:=0; 
end do: 
 
for j from 1 to N+1 do 
for i from 1 to N+1 do 
 q[j]:=Equ[j,i]*y[i]+q[j]; 
end do: 
end do: 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
  cnsts[i]:=q[i]<=0; 
end do: 
cnsts[N+1]:=q[N+1]<=-1; 
 
set1:={seq(cnsts[i],i=1..N+1)}; 
##print(set1); 
 
 
obj := -y[N+1]: 
Y:=maximize(obj,set1,NONNEGATIVE); 
##print(Y); 
 
end proc: 
> LP_method_minmax:=proc(A) 
global Y; 
local i,j,q,A1,Equ,cnsts,obj,set1; 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
 for j from 1 to N do 
 49 
 
  A1[i,j]:=A[i,j]; 
 end do: 
end do: 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
 for j from 1 to N do 
  A1[i,j]:=A1[i,j]+2; 
 end do: 
end do: 
 
 
Equ:=Matrix(N+1); 
 
for i from 1 to N+1 do 
 for j from 1 to N+1 do 
 if i<N+1 and j<N+1 then Equ[i,j]:=A1[i,j]; end if; 
 if i=N+1 and j<N+1 then Equ[i,j]:=-1; end if; 
 if i<N+1 and j=N+1 then Equ[i,j]:=-1; end if; 
 if i=N+1 and j=N+1 then Equ[i,j]:=0; end if; 
 
 end do: 
end do: 
 
##print(Equ); 
 
for i from 1 to N+1 do 
q[i]:=0; 
end do: 
 
for j from 1 to N+1 do 
for i from 1 to N+1 do 
 q[j]:=Equ[i,j]*y[i]+q[j]; 
end do: 
end do: 
 
for i from 1 to N do 
  cnsts[i]:=q[i]>=0; 
end do: 
cnsts[N+1]:=q[N+1]>=-1; 
 
set1:={seq(cnsts[i],i=1..N+1)}; 
##print(set1); 
 
 
obj := -y[N+1]: 
Y:=minimize(obj,set1,NONNEGATIVE); 
#print(Y); 
 
 
end proc: 
>  
full_support:=proc(Y1) 
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local count1,i;  
global check; 
 
check:=0; count1:=0; 
 
 for i from 1 to N do 
 if op(2,Y1[i])>0 then count1:=count1+1; end if; 
 end do: 
 if count1=N then print("*************** This game is Full 
Support***************"); check:=1; end if; 
 
end proc: 
> 
Uniform_dis:=proc(Y1) 
 local count1, I; 
 global check2; 
check2:=0;count1:=0; 
for I from 1 to N do 
 if (op(2,Y1[i]))=(1/N) then count1:=count1+1; end if; 
 end do: 
if count1=N then print(“the Optimal strategy is Uniform”); 
check2:=1; end if; 
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Chapter 3 
Inspection game with Partial Inspections 
3.1 Introduction 
An inspection game is a mathematical model for a game between two 
players, where one (the inspectee / potential violator) has enough 
potential to violate a certain legal act. The other player (the inspector) 
tries to verify the inspectee’s adherence to those legal acts by carrying out 
inspections over a certain period of time. 
Dresher (1962) has studied the case where the inspectee can commit at 
most one violation during 𝑚 periods of times, while the number of 
inspections is limited to a fixed number 𝑛. Dresher supposed that if the 
inspector inspects when the inspectee violates, the violation would be 
detected with probability of 𝑃 = 1. In each stage both players know how 
many inspection and time periods are left. So, if 𝑛 ≥ 𝑚 then the inspectee 
will not violate as he knows that he will be caught for certain. Due to lack 
of usually 𝑛 < 𝑚. Dresher has determined the value and optimal 
strategies for these cases. Various version of the Inspection game 
introduced by Dresher’s paper, have been analysed in several studies; 
such as in the works by, B. von Stengel (1991), M. J. Canty et al. (2000) and 
Rothenstein and Zamir (2002). 
In this study, I assume that the inspector may run some “partial 
inspections” where the probability of detection is not equal to one. The 
inspections with the probability of detection equal to one would be called 
a “full inspection”.  
The assumption of partial inspection is a more realistic representation of 
real world problems as full inspection can be too costly or time 
consuming. Hence, instead of a full inspection the inspector may run some 
partial inspections with lower cost and effort. Hence, by conducting a 
partial check the probability of detection would be 𝑃, which is not 
necessarily equal to one. A famous form of partial inspections a famous 
52 
 
form of partial inspections applies to airplane safety checks. The full safety 
check of the plane typically takes more than two days, which is a long and 
costly ground time for the airplanes, making partial inspections much 
more favourable. However, it is critical that effective inspections 
guarantee the safety of the flight.  I model the situation as a non-
cooperative zero sum game and  describe the value and optimal strategies 
of the game using recursive formulae. In particular, I compare the value of 
the game for inspection games with full and partial inspections only and 
hence determine the opportunity costs for using these technologies. In a 
number of cases I provide closed form solutions for the values of the game 
and the optimal strategies.  
In Section 3.2 of this study I review the literature regarding Inspection 
game, of which the classical form was originally proposed by Dresher 
(1962). In Section 3.4 I introduce the concept of partial inspections and 
also I analyse the inspection with just partial inspections. By providing a 
formula for calculating the value of this game, we can have a tool to make 
a comparison between full inspections and partial inspections.  
In the next section, I investigate the case where the inspector can choose 
between full inspection, partial inspection and no control in each period of 
time. I show that in equilibrium the inspector always mixes between full 
inspections and no control. It means that as long as the opportunity for a 
full inspection exists, the inspector never starts his sequential inspections 
with a partial inspection. I also provide a way to calculate the values. This 
could offer a useful tool for comparison of partial and full inspection, 
resulting in a classical result of inspection game with full inspections.  
 
3.2 Literature review 
The inspection game is a mathematical model where one player verifies 
the commitment of the other player to the certain legal agreements. An 
example of this could be a customs officer and smuggler at the border 
control. The customs officer knows that smugglers have enough potential 
to illegally carry some goods across a border line. However, because of the 
perishable nature of the goods, the smuggler will choose one of the 1 to 𝑚 
possible time units to carry out the violation. A further example is arm 
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control treaties, when the there is enough potential that the treaty is 
violated. Hence, the game is between an inspector and a potential violator 
which is called inspectee. The problem that typically arises within this 
situation is because of a lack of inspector’s budget to run an inspection in 
all the events. The amount of the inspection which is left and period of 
time is common knowledge for both players. Hence, the inspectee knows 
that there is a chance to violates without being detected.  
Seemingly the first genuine inspection game was introduced and analysed 
by Dresher (1962)1. In Dresher’s study, the inspector has 𝑛 number of 
inspections, where there is 𝑚 period of time. He models the situation as 
some sequential zero-sum games. In his model the inspector’s payoff for 
the detected violation is +1, and -1 for the undetected violation. If the 
inspector can inspect all events then the inspectee knows that he will 
definitely be caught if he violates. He will therefore not violate, and the 
payoff for both players will be 0. If we show the value of the game by 
𝑣(𝑛, 𝑚), where 𝑚 is the number of events and 𝑛 is number of available 
inspections we have following boundary conditions. 
𝑣(𝑛, 0) = −1,   𝑣(𝑛, 𝑛) = 0. 
Dresher found the closed form of the value and optimal strategies. 
Different versions of the game have been analysed so far. Maschler (1966) 
analysed the inspection game with different boundary conditions. He 
shows that the expected payoff of inspector and inspectee by 𝑣(𝑛, 𝑚) and 
𝑤(𝑛, 𝑚) where 𝑚 is the number of events and 𝑛 is number of available 
inspections, the boundary conditions are 
𝑣(𝑛, 𝑛) = 𝛼, 𝑤(𝑛, 𝑛) = 𝛽 where 𝛼 > 1, 0 < 𝛽 < 1. 
𝑣(𝑛, 𝑛) = 0, 𝑤(𝑛, 𝑛) = 1. 
Similar to the Dresher paper, Maschler calculates the closed form of 
𝑣(𝑛, 𝑚) and 𝑤(𝑛, 𝑚). Further works by Maschler (1967) analyses the 
inspection game as a non-constant-sum game, where each event can 
produce a special signal to indicate if it is natural or violated.  
                                                             
1 Dresher’s game is fully explained and discussed in Section 3.2. 
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More recent works include Von Stengel (1991) and Von Stengel (2016), 
where it is suggested that the inspectee violate more than one time and 
collect different values of rewards by each violation.  The common feature 
of these works is expecting a one hundred percent accurate result from an 
inspection. It means that when there is simultaneous inspection and 
violation the violation is detected for sure. However, in real world this is 
not always the case.  
To my knowledge, the first paper to model the situation between  custom 
officer and smuggler, where the custom officer’s inspections are  
imperfect is Thomas and Nisgav (1976). Similarly to Dresher they assume 
that there are 𝑚 periods of time and due to lack of budget the inspector 
can just run 𝑛 < 𝑚 inspections. However, the inspections can detect the 
violation with probability of 𝑃. This means that in a simultaneous 
inspection and violation, the payoff for the inspector will be 2𝑃 − 1. 
Besides, if we show the value of the game by 𝑔(𝑛, 𝑚), where 𝑚 is the 
number of events and 𝑛 is number of available inspection, we will have 
following boundary conditions 
𝑔(𝑛, 0) = −1,   𝑔(𝑛, 𝑛) = 2𝑃 − 1. 
By all these assumptions they calculate the value of the game and optimal 
strategies of the players.  They also introduce the case where the customs 
officer can use two of his inspections in a night to increase the probability 
of detection. Moreover, they introduce the situation where the customs 
officer has two different type of inspection with different probabilities of 
detection, and he can choose to run both in a night to achieve a higher 
probability of detection, or separately to cover more of the events as 
inspected. They model both scenarios as a recursive zero-sum game; 
however, they are unable to find the closed form of the value and optimal 
strategies as the equations are getting too complicated. 
Later, Baston and Bostock (1991) investigate the problem introduced by 
Thomas and Nisgav (1976) one more time. In their model, the customs 
officer can have 𝑘1 number of inspections with probability of detection 𝑃1 
and  𝑘2 number of inspections with probability of detection 𝑃2. Customs 
officers can run these two type of inspections separately or together. The 
probability of detection in a joint inspection is 𝑝 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑃1, 𝑃2}.   
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They also suppose that when there is no any violation, the customs 
officer’s payoff is  1. It means that customs officer is indifferent between a 
detected violation and no violation. This is also assumed by Thomas and 
Nisgav (1976). This assumption is different from Dresher’s model where 
inspectee will not violate if he is sure that he will be detected. However, 
this difference will not change the closed form of value found by  Thomas 
and Nisgav (1976) for the case of one kind of inspection and 𝑚 number of 
period of times (only the boundary condition will change). 
In the games analysed by Baston and Bostock (1991) the assumption plays 
a critical role. They modelled the situation as a zero-sum game and 
calculated the value of the game. However, they mention that the game 
with the same assumption as Dresher includes much more complicated 
equations even if even the probability of detection is supposed to be 1.   
Further models where they include an inspection game with probability of 
detection less than 1 are inspection games with imperfect inspections. The 
concept of imperfect inspection differs from the kind of inspection (partial 
inspection) that I am analysing in this study. Imperfect inspection is the 
inspection with two different types of error. Type One Error means that 
the inspector may call a false alarm (with probability of 𝛼), and Type Two 
Error means that the inspector may fail to detect the violation (with 
probability of 𝛽). In an imperfect inspection, an error has happened. 
However in partial inspection the inspector intentionally chooses the 
partial inspection, despite the fact he knows its probability of detection is 
not equal to 1. 
In industries such as aviation, the kind of the inspection used is partial 
inspections, since the full inspection (inspection with probability of 
detection equal to 1) is too costly and time consuming. For example, a full 
safety check of the airplane may take more than three days which imposes 
a significant monetary cost to the airlines. Hence, the safety inspectors 
intentionally run some partial inspections. There may be some occasions 
which they switch to full inspections, but partial inspection is always one 
of the methods of inspection. 
Imperfect inspection has been analysed in different version of inspection 
game. Some of the papers include Rothenstein and Zamir (2002) and 
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Avenhaus and Canty (2005). However, there are not many studies 
investigating the concept of partial inspection. 
The kind of inspections in Thomas and Nisgav (1976) and Baston and 
Bostock (1991) can also be considered as “Partial inspection”. However, 
these studies have different assumptions of the classical inspection 
games, which makes the equations slightly easier. Besides, the case of 
mixing between different types of inspections is not considered.  
In this study, I investigate the concept of “partial inspection” in a model 
with the same assumptions of classical inspection games (similar to 
Dresher paper), also I analyse the case where in optimal strategy the 
inspector is mixing between full inspection and partial inspection. 
 
3.3 Classical Inspection Game 
Dresher (1962) introduced a sequential zero-sum game with two players. 
One of the players committed to certain legal act. However he has enough 
potential to violate if he is sure that he is not going to be caught. The 
other player runs some inspections to ensure that the inspectee does not 
violate.  There are 𝑚  number of events that the violation can happen, and 
the number of the inspections is limited to 𝑛. Because of lack of budget 
usually 𝑛 < 𝑚. The inspector cannot run more than one inspection in each 
period of time. However, he still cannot cover all the suspicious events. 
The inspectee may run at most one violation, and after violation the game 
will be ended. The Number of the inspections and events left is the 
common knowledge for both players in any stage of the game. The payoff 
of a detected violation for inspector is +1 and no detection is -1. If no 
violation happens in the whole the game, the payoff for both players will 
be 0. At the beginning of each event (period of time) the inspectee will 
decide to act legally or violate. Dresher (1962) models the game as a 
dynamical zero-sum game. He denoted the value of the game by 𝑉(𝑛, 𝑚), 
where 𝑛 is the number of inspections and m is the period of times. Hence, 
he describes the game by the following table. 
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                Inspectee 
Inspector 
   Legal act                   violation 
Inspection 
 
No Control  
𝑉(𝑛 − 1, 𝑚 − 1)             +1 
 
𝑉(𝑛, 𝑚 − 1)                     -1 
Table 3. 1. Inspection game modelled by Dresher. 
If 𝑛 ≥ 𝑚, then 𝑉(𝑛, 𝑚 − 1) = 0. Also, 𝑉(𝑛, 0) = 0 and 𝑉(0, 𝑚) = −1 
where 𝑚 > 0. 
As we know that −1 ≤ 𝑉(𝑛, 𝑚) ≤ 1, the players mix between their 
strategies. If 𝑝, is the probability of running an inspection then we have 
𝑝. 𝑉(𝑛 − 1, 𝑚 − 1) + (1 − 𝑝). 𝑉(𝑛, 𝑚 − 1) = 𝑝. 1 + (1 − 𝑝). (−1).  
Besides if in equilibrium we denote the probability of violation by 𝑞, then 
we have 
𝑉(𝑛 − 1, 𝑚 − 1). 𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞). (1) = 𝑉(𝑛, 𝑚 − 1). 𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞). (−1). 
Hence, we can find the value of the game by following recursive formulas 
𝑉(𝑛, 𝑚) =
𝑉(𝑛,𝑚−1)+𝑉(𝑛−1,𝑚−1)
𝑉(𝑛−1,𝑚)+2−𝑉(𝑛−1,𝑚−1)
 .                                                        (3.3.1) 
Besides, in equilibrium the probability of inspection is  
𝑝 =
𝑉(𝑛−1,𝑚)+1
𝑉(𝑛−1,𝑚)+2−𝑉(𝑛−1,𝑚−1)
  ,                                                                   (3.3.2) 
And the probability of violation is 
𝑞 =
2
𝑉(𝑛−1,𝑚)+2−𝑉(𝑛−1,𝑚−1)
  ,                                                                    (3.3.4) 
Dresher (1962) shows that explicit formula for recursive formula (3.3.1) 
can be given by 
𝑉(𝑛, 𝑚) = −
(
𝑚−1
𝑛
)
∑ (
𝑚
𝑖
)𝑛𝑖=0
  (𝑛 < 𝑚).                                                          (3.3.5) 
As, we see by know the explicit formula for the value of the game we can 
find the probability of inspection and probability of violation as well. 
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3.4 Full Inspection vs. Partial Inspection 
In this study, I assume that the inspector may run some partial inspections 
as well as full inspections. As I mentioned in the literature review, by 
partial inspection I mean an inspection which can detect the violation by 
probability 𝑃. That is not because of any possible mistake by the inspector 
and is just the nature of the inspection. The inspection in any form (full or 
partial) is always necessary as it is the only means to prevent the 
inspectee performing a violation. Similar to Dresher’s paper, we have 
modelled the situation as a zero sum game. I denote the value of the 
game by 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃), where 𝑛1 is the number of full inspections (which 
have the probability of detection equal to one), 𝑛2 is the number of the 
partial inspections, 𝑚 is the number of the period of times and 𝑃 is the 
probability of the detection in partial inspections. 𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚 and 𝑃 are fixed 
through the whole game. In each stage of the game the inspector and 
inspectee both know how many inspections and time periods have been 
left. Also, in each stage of the game, the inspector can run just one 
inspection which can be full or partial.  
The payoffs are similar to those in Dresher’s paper. The only difference 
arises when the inspectee violates and the inspector partially inspects. In 
this case the inspector wins with probability 𝑃 while he loses with 
probability 1 − 𝑃. So the expected payoff to the inspector is 2𝑃 − 1. In 
any case, the game ends because the inspectee either achieves his aim or 
gets caught. 
Obviously, when 𝑛2 is equal to zero, the game is completely similar to 
Dresher game and we would have following conditions. 
𝑣(𝑛1, 0, 𝑚, 𝑃) = 0; 𝑛1 ≥ 𝑚,  0 ≤ 𝑃 ≤ 1.  𝑚 ≥ 1.    
𝑣(0,0, 𝑚, 𝑃) = −1;  0 ≤ 𝑃 ≤ 1. 
And also we assume 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 0, 𝑃) =0; which means when no time period 
has been left of course there would be no detection and not violation. 
In our analysis, we exclude the cases of 𝑃 = 0 and 𝑃 = 1. As obviously, if 
we denote the value of Dresher’s game by 𝑉 then 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
𝑉(𝑛1, 𝑚) and 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) = 𝑉(𝑛1 + 𝑛2, 𝑚) where 𝑃 = 0 and P=1; 
respectively. 
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Additional to the initial conditions discussed before, we have following 
initial conditions: 
𝑣(0, 𝑚, 𝑚, 𝑃) = 2𝑃 − 1, 0 < 𝑃 <
1
2
, 𝑚 ≥ 1; (As the probability of 
detection is not so high, hence in equilibrium the inspectee will choose to 
violate in a Nash equilibrium). 
𝑣(0, 𝑚, 𝑚, 𝑃) = 0,
1
2
≤ 𝑃 ≤ 1, 𝑚 ≥ 1; (As the probability of detection is 
high, in equilibrium the inspectee will not violate). 
Theorem 3. 1. 2 In an inspection game, 𝒗(𝟎, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝑷), 𝒎 > 𝟎 where 𝑷 is 
the probability of detection in the partial inspection, the value of the 
game is as follows 
a) If 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2 then 𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
2𝑃
𝑚
− 1, 𝑚 > 0, 
b) If 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1 then (0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) = −
𝑚−1
𝑚−1+2𝑃
, 𝑚 > 0. 
Proof: 
For 𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) we have following table 
                Inspectee 
Inspector 
   Legal act                   Violation 
Partial Inspection 
 
No Control  
𝑣(0,0, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)          2 𝑃 − 1 
 
𝑣(0,1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)                 -1 
Table 3. 2. The inspection game with one partial inspections and 𝒎 period of times. 
We know that 𝑣(0,0, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃) = −1. Hence, players are mixing between 
their strategies. By employing the formula in Appendix B.1 we have 
𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
−1+(2𝑃−1)𝑣(0,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
𝑣(0,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2𝑃+1
 .                                                (3.4.1)        
Besides, we have following initial conditions 𝑣(0,1,1) = 2𝑃 − 1 for 
0 < 𝑃 < 1/2,  and 𝑣(0,1,1) = 0 for 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1. As we see, the initial 
conditions satisfy part a and b respectively. Hence, they can be used as the 
start point of an induction.  
                                                             
2 The formula of the part a of this theorem has been also found by Thomas and Nisgav (1976), for a 
model which is slightly different. In their model, in the case of no violation Inspector’s payoff is 1. This 
change just affect the border condition and not the general formula.     
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We can easily see that 
2𝑃
𝑚+1
− 1 =
−1+(2𝑃−1)(
2𝑃
𝑚
−1)
2𝑃
𝑚
−1+2𝑃+1
 and −
𝑚−1
𝑚−1+2𝑃
=
−1+(2𝑃−1)(−
𝑚
𝑚+2𝑃
)
−
𝑚
𝑚+2𝑃
+2𝑃+1
 . Hence, we prove the theorem inductively, ∎.   
Theorem 3. 2.  In an inspection game, 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) where 𝑛2 < 𝑚, 
where 𝑃 is the probability of detection in the partial check, the value of 
the game is as follows 
a) 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚
− 1, 0 <  𝑃 < 1/2; 
b) 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) = −
(𝑚−1𝑛2
)
∑ (
𝑚
𝑖 )(2𝑃−1)
𝑛2−𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=0
 , 1/2 <  𝑃 < 1.3 
 Proof: 
For 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚) we have following table 
 
                Inspectee 
Inspector 
   Legal act                   Violation 
Partial Inspection 
 
No Control  
𝑣(0, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)      2𝑃 − 1 
 
𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)                     -1 
Table 3. 3. The inspection game with just partial inspections. 
 
Hence, we can calculate the value by the following recursive formulae, 
𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
(2P−1)𝑣(0,𝑛2 ,𝑚−1,𝑃)+𝑣(0,𝑛2−1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
𝑣(0,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2P−𝑣(0,𝑛2−1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
,                               (3.4.2) 
We know that 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑛2, 𝑃) = 2𝑃 − 1 for 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2 and 
𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑛2, 𝑃) = 0 for 
1
2
< 𝑃 < 1, which they both satisfy (3.4.2). 
For part a, suppose that 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚
− 1 we should prove that 
𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚 + 1, 𝑃) =
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚+1
− 1. We can easily see that 
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚+1
− 1 =
(2P−1)(
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚
−1) +
2(𝑛2−1)𝑃
𝑚
−1
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚
−1+2P−
2(𝑛2−1)𝑃
𝑚
+1
 . Hence, 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚 + 1, 𝑃) =
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚+1
− 1.  
                                                             
3 While calculating 𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) we can see in the Table 3.2 that when players are mixing, then the crucial value is 𝑃 = 1/2,  as in 
this case 2𝑃 − 1 = 0. We have modelled the game as a recursive game hence 𝑃 = 1/2 will be the crucial value for 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
in Theorem 3.2 as well. 
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For part b4, let 𝑠(𝑛2, 𝑚) = ∑ (
𝑚
𝑖
) (2𝑝 − 1)𝑛2−𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=0 . Hence, we will have  
𝑠(𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1) = (2𝑃 − 1). 𝑠(𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚 − 1) + (
𝑚 − 1
𝑛2
) and  
𝑠(𝑛2, 𝑚) = 𝑠(𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1) + 𝑠(𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚 − 1). We can see that 
𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) = −
(𝑚−1𝑛2
)
𝑠(𝑛,𝑘)
  satisfies the recursive formulae (3.4.2), ∎. 
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 can provide the efficient tool to compare 
full inspections with partial inspections. Not only can we compare the 
different inspection games, we can also easily calculate how many partial 
inspections are required to achieve a certain probability of detection 
similar to that gained from a full inspection (classical inspection game). 
The following examples show different kind of useful comparisons that we 
can make.   
Example 3.3. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the value of three different 
inspection games when the number of events is changing. The first game 
which is shown by red dots is the inspection game with just one full 
inspection. The other inspection games which are shown by green and 
blue dots are inspection games with just one partial with probability of 
detection equal to 2/3 and 1/3, respectively. As we could predict, in Figure 
3.4 we can see that for any value of 𝒎, 𝒗(𝟏, 𝟎, 𝒎, 𝑷) ≥ 𝒗(𝟎, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝟐/𝟑) ≥
𝒗(𝟎, 𝟏, 𝒎,
𝟏
𝟑
). We can also observe that, as 𝒎 is getting larger the value of 
the all the games is approaching -1.  
                                                             
4 This part of the proof is similar to the proof in Rinderle (1996). 
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Figure 3. 4.  Comparison between the value of the inspection game with just one full 
inspection, or one partial inspection where the probability of detection is 1/3 and 2/3. 
Example 3. 4.  Figure 3.5 compares the value of the inspection games with 
just one and two full inspections with the inspection game with one and 
two partial inspections, where probability of detection is 2/3. We can see 
that for any value of 𝒎, 𝒗(𝟐, 𝟎, 𝒎, 𝟏) ≥ 𝒗(𝟎, 𝟐, 𝒎, 𝟐/𝟑) ≥ 𝒗(𝟏, 𝟎, 𝒎, 𝟐/
𝟑) ≥ 𝒗(𝟎, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝟐/𝟑). 
 
Figure 3. 5. The comparison between Inspection games with just full inspections, and 
inspection games with just partial inspections. 
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As I mentioned, by employing Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 we can find 
out how many partial inspection are required to have the same value a full 
inspection. The following example provides a comparison between value 
of the inspection game with just full inspections and just partial 
inspections.  
Example 3. 5. Suppose an inspection game with 2 full inspections and 6 
periods of time. Hence by the Dresher formula (formula 3.3.5) we know 
that 𝑣(2,0,6, 𝑃) = 𝑉(2,7) = −0.3125. If the inspector decides to, instead 
of full inspection, run partial inspections with probability of detection 
equal 2/5, he will need at least five partial inspections. As we know that 
𝑣(0,4,7,2/5) < −0.3125 < 𝑣(0,5,7,2/5). 
Example 3. 6. Figure 3.6 demonstrates that if we have 100 period of times, 
for different numbers of full inspections (𝒏𝟏) how many partial inspections 
(𝒏𝟐) are required to get the same value. In this example, the probability of 
detection for the partial inspection is 2/3. The blue line is the relation 
between the number of full and partial inspections, and the red line is 
when 𝒏𝟏 = 𝒏𝟐. Hence we can easily see that relation between the 
number of full and partial inspections is not linear. 
 
 
 Figure 3. 6. The relation between number of full inspections and partial inspections to 
guarantee the same value. 
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The following theorem explains the results in Example 3.6 theoretically. 
Theorem 3. 7. For an inspection game with 𝒏𝟏 number of full inspections, 
we need at least [(−
(
𝒎−𝟏
𝒏𝟏
)
∑ (
𝒎
𝒊
)𝒏𝒊=𝟎
+ 𝟏) (
𝒎
𝟐𝑷
)] + 𝟏 partial inspections with a 
probability of detection 𝑷 to achieve the same value, if < 𝑷 < 𝟏/𝟐 . 
Proof: 
By Dresher formula we know that the value of an inspection game with n 
full inspection is  −
(
𝑚−1
𝑛1
)
∑ (
𝑚
𝑖
)𝑛𝑖=0
 . Besides, by Theorem 3.2 we know that 
when 0 <  𝑃 < 1/2, the value of the inspection game with 𝑛2 number of 
partial inspections is  
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚
− 1. 
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚
− 1 = −
(
𝑚−1
𝑛1
)
∑ (
𝑚
𝑖
)𝑛𝑖=0
⇔ 𝑛2 = (−
(
𝑚−1
𝑛1
)
∑ (
𝑚
𝑖
)𝑛𝑖=0
+ 1) (
𝑚
2𝑃
), 
Hence, we need  𝑛2 = [(−
(
𝑚−1
𝑛1
)
∑ (
𝑚
𝑖
)𝑛𝑖=0
+ 1) (
𝑚
2𝑃
)] + 1, ∎. 
We cannot have a kind of similar theorem for 1/2 <  𝑃 < 1, as it is not 
possible to find the explicit formula for 𝑛2.  
Theorem 3. 8.  Consider an inspection game with no full inspection, 𝑛2 
number of partial inspections and 𝑚 period of time, where 𝑃 is the 
probability of detection in partial inspections. If 𝑝 is the probability of 
assigning a partial check and 𝑞 is the probability of selecting one of the 
times to violate, then for 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2 we have 
 𝑝 =
𝑛2
𝑚
 (probability of assigning a partial check), 
       𝑞 = 1 −
1
𝑚
 (probability of selecting one of the times to violate). 
For 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1 we have 
𝑝 =
(2𝑃)𝑛2−1 + (2𝑃)𝑛2−2 (
𝑚 − 𝑛2
1
) + ⋯ + (
𝑚 − 2
𝑛2 − 1
)
(2𝑃)𝑛2 + (2𝑃)𝑛2−1 (
𝑚 − 𝑛2
1
) + ⋯ + (2𝑃) (
𝑚 − 2
𝑛2 − 1
) + (
𝑚 − 1
𝑛2
)
  , 
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𝑞 = 1 −
2𝑃
−
(
𝑚−2
𝑛2
)
∑ (𝑚−1
𝑖
)(2𝑃−1)𝑛2−𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=0
+
(
𝑚−2
𝑛2−1
)
∑ (𝑚−1
𝑖
)(2𝑃−1)𝑛2−𝑖−1
𝑛2−1
𝑖=0
  . 
Proof: 
By employing Table 3.3 we know that in the equilibrium we have  
𝑝𝑣(0, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)
= 𝑝(2𝑃 − 1) + (1 − 𝑝)(−1) 
and 
𝑞(2𝑃 − 1) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑣(0, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)
= −𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃) 
 
𝑝 =
𝑣(0,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)+1
𝑣(0,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2P−𝑣(0,𝑛2−1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
  ,                                               (3.8.1) 
1 − 𝑞 =
2𝑃
𝑣(0,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)−𝑣(0,𝑛2−1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2P
  .                                       (3.8.2)                       
For 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2, by the Theorem 3.2 we know that 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
2𝑛2𝑃
𝑚
− 1. Hence, by formula 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 we can see that 𝑝 =
𝑛2
𝑚
 and 
𝑞 = 1 −
1
𝑚
 . 
For 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1, by the Theorem 3.2 we know that 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
−
(𝑚−1𝑛2
)
∑ (
𝑚
𝑖 )(2𝑃−1)
𝑛2−𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=0
 . Hence, by employing formula 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 we can 
show the result, ∎. 
 
3.5 Inspection Game with Partial Inspection 
In this section I consider a version of Inspection game, that the inspector 
can employ both of the inspection technologies. In other words, 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 
are both positive. We can describe the 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2 , 𝑚, 𝑃) by following table 
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                Inspectee 
Inspector 
   Legal act                   violation 
Full   Inspection 
 
Partial Inspection 
 
No Control  
 𝑣(𝑛1 − 1, 𝑛2 , 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)                      +1                   
 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)             2 𝑃 − 1 
 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)                                  -1 
Table 3. 7. Inspection game with Partial Inspection 
We know that  
𝑣(𝑛1 − 1, 𝑛2 , 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃) < 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃) < 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃). 
Besides, for all value of 𝑛1, 𝑛2 and 𝑚 −1 ≤ 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) ≤ 1. On the 
other hand, as 0< 𝑃 < 1 we know that 0< 2𝑃 − 1 < 1. Hence, we can 
easily observe that there is a mixed strategy equilibrium. To analyse the 
equilibrium three cases may happen. 
Case 1: In equilibrium inspector mixes between No Control and Full 
inspection. 
Case 2: In equilibrium inspector mixes between No Control and Partial 
inspection. 
Case 3: In equilibrium inspector mixes between Full-inspection and Partial 
inspection. 
These cases are shown in the following figures. In all the following graphs 
horizontal line shows the probability of the violation (𝑞) by the inspectee 
and the vertical line shows the expected pay off for the inspector.   
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Green line denotes Not- check strategy, while inspectee is mixing between violate and not violate. 
Blue line denotes Full- check strategy, while inspectee is mixing between violate and not violate.  
Grey line denotes Partial- check strategy, while inspectee is mixing between violate and not violate.   
The equilibrium point (Minmax strategy) has been denoted by a circle.  
Figure 3. 8. Three possible cases for the equilibrium in inspection game with partial inspection 
By knowing the initial condition of the value and the fact that the 
equilibrium is one of the cases in Figure 3.8, we can design a computer 
program to calculate the 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃). The Maple code for computing 
the equilibrium point and its description are provided in Appendix B.1. The 
value of the game with one full inspection and one partial inspection is 
shown in the following two tables. Some other examples are provided in 
Appendix B.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
𝑣(𝑛1 − 1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
𝑣(𝑛1 − 1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
+1 +1 +1 
-1 -1 -1 
2P-1 
2P-1 
2P-1 
𝑞 𝑞 𝑞 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
𝑣(𝑛1 − 1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
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𝑚 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃), 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2 Type of 
the Case 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
Table 3. 9. 𝒗(𝟏, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝑷) for 𝟐 ≤ 𝒎 ≤ 𝟔 where 𝟎 < 𝑷 < 𝟏/𝟐. 
 
𝑚 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃), 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1 
 
Type of 
the Case 
2 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
0 
 
 
 
 
Case 1 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
Table 3. 10. 𝒗(𝟏, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝑷) for 𝟐 ≤ 𝒎 ≤ 𝟔 where 𝟏/𝟐 < 𝑷 < 𝟏. 
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Employing computer programing is computationally costly and slow. The 
following theorems help to find the value and optimal strategies much 
quicker. 
Theorem 3. 8. For the Inspection game 𝒗(𝟏, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝑷), when 𝒎 > 𝟐, in the 
equilibrium the inspector is mixing between Full-inspection and Not-
inspection. 
Proof: 
We can describe the game by the following graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 11. Inspection game with one full inspection and one partial inspection 
  is the connection of Full check line and Not check line.  
  is the connection of Partial check line and Not check line.  
  is the connection of Partial check line and Full check line. 
    is the line passing the intersection of Partial check line and Full check line, and (1,-1). 
In the Graph 2.3 we know that 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) > 𝑣(1,0, 𝑚, 𝑃) > 𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃); 
however we do not know if 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚. 
If 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚 then the equilibrium point is at intersection of Full 
inspection and No control; on the other hand, if 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) < 𝑋𝑚 then 
the equilibrium point is at intersection of Partial inspection and No 
control. 
We want to show that 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚, ∀ 𝑚 > 2; and as a result the 
equilibrium point is the intersection of full inspection and not inspection. 
We know that 𝑣(0,1,1, 𝑃) = 0, 𝑣(1,0,1, 𝑃) = 0 and 𝑣(1,1,1, 𝑃) = 0 for 
1
2
< 𝑃 < 1; as a result 𝑣(1,1,2, 𝑃) = 0 for 
1
2
< 𝑃 < 1 where in equilibrium 
the inspector is mixing between all of his strategies. Besides, as we know  
𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃)? 
 
𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃)? 
 
𝑣(1,0, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
 
𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
 
+1 
 2𝑃 − 1 
 
−1 
 
 𝑌𝑚+1 
 𝑋𝑚 𝑞 
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𝑣(1,1,2, 𝑃) = 0, 𝑣(1,0,2, 𝑃) = −
1
3
 and 𝑣(0,1,2, 𝑃) = −
1
2𝑃+1
 ; as a result 
we can easily calculate that 𝑣(1,1,3, 𝑃) = −
1
4𝑃+3
 where in equilibrium 
inspector is mixing between full inspection and no control. 
Suppose that 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚; we have to show that 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚 +
1, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚+1.  
We know that 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚 if and only if 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚 + 1, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑌𝑚+1; 
hence if we show that 𝑌𝑚+1 ≥ 𝑋𝑚+1 then it will implies that 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚 +
1, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚+1. 
Full inspection line is the line passing two following points 
(0, 𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃)) and (1, 1). By Theorem 3.1 we know that  𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
−
𝑚−1
𝑚−1+2𝑃
 . So the full inspection line is
. 
Partial inspection line is the line passing two following points 
(0, 𝑣(1,0, 𝑚, 𝑃)) and (1, 2𝑃 − 1). By the Dresher formula (formula 3.3.5) 
we know that  𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) = −
𝑚−1
𝑚+1
 . So the partial inspection line is 
. 
Hence, the intersection of full inspection and partial inspection line is 
𝑥1 = , 𝑦1 = . 
. 
Hence,  𝑌𝑚+1 = −
(𝑚−1)𝑚
2𝑃𝑚+𝑚2+2𝑃+𝑚−2
 . 
 
On the other hand, the line between (𝑥1, 𝑦1) and (1,-1) is 
 
𝑥−𝑥1
𝑦−𝑦1
=
1−𝑥1
−1−𝑦1
. If 𝑥 = 0, then 𝑦 = (
1−𝑦1
−1−𝑥
) (−𝑥1) + 𝑦1. 
 Hence, 𝑋𝑚 = . 
As a result, 𝑌𝑚+1 − 𝑋𝑚+1 = , 
which is positive for 𝑚 > 2 and 𝑃 >
1
2
. Hence, if 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1 in 
equilibrium the inspector is mixing between full inspection and no control. 
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We know that for 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2, in the game 𝑣(1,1,3, 𝑃) in equilibrium the 
inspector is mixing between full inspection and no control (Case 1). Hence, 
similar to the induction we made for 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1 we suppose that 
𝑣(1,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚 and we have to show that 𝑣(1,1, 𝑚 + 1, 𝑃) ≥ 𝑋𝑚+1, 
which is equivalent to show 𝑌𝑚+1 − 𝑋𝑚+1 ≥ 0.   
Full inspection line is the line passing two following points 
[(0, 𝑣(0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃)), (1, 1)]. We know by Theorem 3.1 that (0,1, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
2𝑃
𝑚
− 1 , so the Full check line is . 
Partial inspection line is the line passing two following points 
[(0, 𝑣(1,0, 𝑚, 𝑃)), (1, 2𝑃 − 1)]. By the Dresher formula we know that  
𝑣(1,0, 𝑚, 𝑃) = −
𝑚−1
𝑚+1
 , so the Partial inspection line is 
. 
 
The Intersection between the full inspection and partial inspection line is 
𝑥1 =
  
 
 
𝑦1 =  
 
Hence,  𝑌𝑚+1 =  . 
 
On the other hand, the line between (𝑥1, 𝑦1) and (1,-1) is 
 
𝑥−𝑥1
𝑦−𝑦1
=
1−𝑥1
−1−𝑦1
. If 𝑥 = 0, then 𝑦 = (
−1−𝑦1
−1−𝑥
) (−𝑥1) + 𝑦1. 
 
Hence, 𝑋𝑚 =  
As a result, 𝑌𝑚+1 − 𝑋𝑚+1 = 
−
2𝑃(𝑃𝑚 + 2𝑃 − 𝑚 − 1)
(𝑃𝑚2 + 2𝑃𝑚 − 𝑚2 + 𝑃 − 2𝑚)(𝑚 + 1)(𝑃𝑚 + 2𝑃 − 𝑚 − 2)
 
We know that 𝑃𝑚2 + 2𝑃𝑚 − 𝑚2 + 𝑃 − 2𝑚 = 𝑚2(𝑃 − 1) +
𝑚(2𝑃 − 2) + 𝑃 which is always negative. On the other hand, (𝑃𝑚 + 2𝑃 −
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𝑚 − 1) and (𝑃𝑚 + 2𝑃 − 𝑚 − 2) are both negative. Hence, 𝑌𝑚+1 − 𝑋𝑚+1 ≥ 0. 
Which means that for 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2 and 𝑚 > 2 in equilibrium the 
inspector mixes between full inspection and no control, ∎. 
Corollary 3. 9. For the inspection game with 1 full inspection and 1 partial 
inspection, if in equilibrium 𝒑(𝟏, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝑷) is the optimal probability of 
assigning the full inspection, and 𝒒(𝟏, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝑷) is probability of violation 
and 𝒗(𝟏, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝑷) is the value of the game then they can be calculated by 
following recursive formulas.   
𝑣(1, 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
𝑣(1,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+𝑣(0,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
𝑣(1,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2−𝑣(0,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
                                          (3.5.1) 
 
𝑝(1, 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
𝑣(1,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+1
𝑣(1,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2−𝑣(0,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
                                          (3.5.2) 
 
𝑞(1, 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
2
𝑣(1,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2−𝑣(0,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
                                          (3.5.3) 
 
Proof: 
We know that we can describe the 𝑣(1, 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) by the following table. 
 
               Inspectee 
Inspector 
Not Violate                              Violate 
Full Inspection  
 
Partial Inspection 
 
No Control 
𝑣(0, 1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)                       +1                    
 
 
𝑣(1, 0, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)                     2P-1 
 
 
𝑣(1, 1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)                     -1 
Table 3. 12. Inspection game with 1 full inspection and 1 partial inspection. 
  
Besides, by Theorem 3.8 we know that in equilibrium the inspector is 
mixing between the full inspection and no control. Hence, as it has been 
explained in Appendix B.1 the value is equal to  
𝑣(1, 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
𝑣(1,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+𝑣(0,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
𝑣(1,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2−𝑣(0,1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
.             
 
𝑝(1, 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) and 𝑞(1, 1, 𝑚, 𝑃) can also be calculated by the formulas 
provided in Appendix B.1, ∎. 
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Theorem 3. 10. In an inspection game with 𝑛1 number of full inspections, 
𝑛2 number of partial inspection and 𝑚 period of times, for 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 ≤ 50 
in the equilibrium we have 
a) For 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2, the inspector mixes between partial inspection 
and full inspection (Case 3) if 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 = 𝑚; and the inspector mixes 
between full inspection and no control (Case 1) if 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 < 𝑚. 
b) For 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1, the inspector mixes between full inspection and 
no control. 
 Proof: 
  By employing the Maple code provided in Appendix B.2 we have 
analyzed all the inspection games with 𝑛1 number of full inspections and 
𝑛2 number of partial inspections and 𝑚 period of times where 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 ≤
𝑚 ≤ 50. The results of the computations are the same with the claim in 
the Theorem, ∎. 
Theorem 3.10 is providing a general guess for the behavior of the players 
in the equilibrium. It seems that except when 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 = 𝑚 and 
0 < 𝑃 < 1/2 which is Case 3, in all the other situations in equilibrium the 
inspector is mixing between full inspection and partial inspection. It means 
that the inspector never starts his sequential inspections with a partial 
inspection. In other words, as long as any opportunity exists for running a 
full inspection, the inspector will not run any partial inspections. Partial 
inspections will be used when no remaining full inspections are available. 
 The other benefit, application of Theorem 3.10 is finding an efficient way 
to determine the value and optimal strategies of the game. The following 
theorem explains how Theorem 3.10 may help to find the more efficient 
way to calculate the value of the game and optimal strategies. 
Theorem 3. 11. If in an inspection game with partial inspection there are a 
number of full inspections, a number of partial inspection and m period of 
times; if we know that in equilibrium the inspector is mixing between full 
inspection and no control then the value of the game can be calculated by 
the values of the previous level by following formula 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
𝑣(𝑛1,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)+𝑣(𝑛1−1,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)
𝑣(𝑛1,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2−𝑣(𝑛1−1,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)
 .                         (3.5.4) 
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If we know that in equilibrium the inspector is mixing between partial 
inspection and no control then the value of the game can be calculated by 
the values of the previous level by following formula 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
(2𝑃−1)𝑣(𝑛1,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)+𝑣(𝑛1,𝑛2−1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
𝑣(𝑛1,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)+2𝑃−𝑣(𝑛1,𝑛2−1,𝑚−1,𝑃)
.                   (3.5.5) 
If we know that in equilibrium the inspector is mixing between partial 
inspection and full inspection then the value of the game can be 
calculated by the values of the previous level by following formula 
𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) =
𝑣(𝑛1,𝑛2−1,𝑚−1,𝑃)−(2𝑃−1)𝑣(𝑛1−1,𝑛2,𝑚−1,𝑃)
𝑣(𝑛1 ,𝑛2−1,𝑚−1,𝑃)+(2−2𝑃)−𝑣(𝑛1−1,𝑛2 ,𝑚−1,𝑃)
 .                 (3.5.6) 
Conclusion 
I investigate the classical inspection game while not all the inspections can 
fully detect the violation. For some cases I show that the inspector always 
applies a full inspection at the beginning of the series of inspections. This 
characteristic leads to find a recursive formula for calculating the value of 
the game. The recursive formulae and its explicit solution computationally 
would be less costly, comparing to the computer programing method. 
Values of the games with a different number of full and partial inspection 
can provide a robust tool to compare the different type of the inspections.   
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B Appendix to Chapter 3 
B.1   The value and optimal strategies for a 2×2 zero-sum 
game 
Let following table be the matrix game of a two player zero-sum game 
(See Von Stengel (1991)). 
      Player 2 
Player 1 
Strategy C         Strategy D 
Strategy A 
          
Strategy B 
      a                         b 
 
      c                         d 
 
If 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏,    𝑐 > 𝑑,        𝑎 ≤ 𝑐,       𝑏 > 𝑑, then we can easily observe that in 
equilibrium players are mixing between their strategies. We denote the 
probability of playing Strategy A by Player 1 with 𝑝, the probability of 
playing Strategy C by Player 2 and the value of the game with 𝑣. As the 
players are indifferent between their strategies then we have 
𝑣 = 𝑝. 𝑎 + (1 − 𝑝). 𝑐 = 𝑝. 𝑏 + (1 − 𝑝). 𝑑, 
𝑣 = 𝑞. 𝑎 + (1 − 𝑞). 𝑏 = 𝑞. 𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞). 𝑑. 
Hence, we have  
𝑝 =
𝑐−𝑑
𝑐−𝑑+𝑏−𝑎
  ,                     (B.1.1) 
𝑞 =
𝑏−𝑑
𝑐−𝑎+𝑏−𝑑
  ,                     (B.1.2) 
𝑣 =
𝑏.𝑐−𝑎.𝑑
𝑐−𝑑+𝑏−𝑎
  .                     (B.1.3) 
 
B.2   Maple code for finding the equilibrium point for the 
inspection game with partial inspection 
The maple code provided in this section finds the equilibrium point and 
calculates the value of the inspection game with partial game for different 
value of full inspection, partial inspection and period of times. The user 
can set the code to work for small (0 < 𝑃 < 1/2) or large (
1
2
< 𝑃 < 1) 
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probability of detection for the partial inspection. The program calculates 
the value of all the games 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 𝑛1 ≤ 𝑁1, 𝑛2 ≤ 𝑁2, 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀  
where 𝑁1, 𝑁2 and 𝑀 can be set by user. 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) where 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 ≤
𝑚 are calculated in following orders.  
First 𝑣(1,1,1, 𝑃) to 𝑣(1,1, 𝑀, 𝑃), then 𝑣(1,2,3, 𝑃) to 𝑣(1,2, 𝑀, 𝑃). This 
continue to 𝑣(1, 𝑁2, 𝑁2 + 1, 𝑃) to 𝑣(1, 𝑁2, 𝑀, 𝑃). Finally, 𝑣(2, 𝑁2, 𝑀, 𝑃) to 
𝑣(2, 𝑁2, 𝑀, 𝑃); which will continue to 𝑣(𝑁1, 2,1, 𝑃) to 𝑣(𝑁1, 2, 𝑀, 𝑃). 
The program runs following steps 
a) Calculating 𝑣(𝑛1, 0, 𝑚, 𝑃) by Dresher formula for 𝑛1 ≤ 𝑁1 and 
𝑚 ≤ 𝑀. 
b) Calculating 𝑣(0, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 𝑛2 ≤ 𝑁2 and 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀  by the formulas 
provided in Theorem 3.2 for small or large value of 𝑃 (Depends on 
user to select which of them) 
c) Setting 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) = 0 for 𝑛1 ≥ 𝑚. 
d) For a given 𝑛1, 𝑛2 and 𝑚, the program calculates the equation of 
following 3 lines given the coordination of their start point and end 
point:  
No control line [(0, 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)), (1, −1)]. 
Partial inspection line [(0, 𝑣(𝑛1, 𝑛2 − 1, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)), (1, 2 ∗ 𝑃 − 1)]. 
Full inspection line [(0, 𝑣(𝑛1 − 1, 𝑛2, 𝑚 − 1, 𝑃)), (1, 1)]. 
e) The program calculates the intersection of each two different lines 
in part e). Hence, we will have the coordination of the following 
point. 
NP= intersection of no control line and Partial inspection line. 
FP= intersection of full inspection line and Partial inspection line. 
FN= intersection of full inspection line and no control line. 
f) The program compares the height of the calculated points for all the 
values of 𝑃. If NP had the greatest height among the others, it 
means that NP is the optimal strategy (Minmax).  Otherwise, the 
equilibrium point is FP or FN. If height of FP is smaller than height of 
FN then the equilibrium point is FP, otherwise it is FN.  
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The following maple codes calculate the value of the game (𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑚, 𝑃) 
𝑛1 ≤ 2, 𝑛2 ≤ 2, 𝑚 ≤ 5. The results of the code are shown by blue.  
 
> restart; 
>  
>  
>  
>  
P := proc(n, k) 
RETURN(product(n-j, j=0..(k-1))) 
end: 
 
> C := proc(n, k) 
RETURN(P(n,k)/k!) 
end: 
 
>  
Value1:=proc(i,m) 
global Value; 
local j,b,A,AA; 
 
if m<=i then Value[i,0,m]:=0; else 
#print(i,m); 
#print(C(m-1,i)); 
A:=C(m-1,i); 
##print("A is",A); 
 
AA:=0; 
for j from 0 to i do 
 b:=C(m,j): 
AA:=AA+b: 
end do: 
#print(AA); 
Value[i,0,m]:=-A/AA; 
end if; 
#print("Value is",i,m,Value[i,0,m]); 
end proc: 
>  
for i from 1 to BB do 
for m from 1 to BB do 
 Value1(i,m-1); 
end do: 
end do: 
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> ##################### for large P 
Vlarge:=proc(n1,n2,m1) 
 global Value; 
 local temp1,i,temp2; 
 temp1:=0; 
for i from 0 to n2 do 
 temp1:=((2*P)^(i))*binomial(m1-1-i,n2-i)+temp1: 
end do: 
 temp2:=binomial(m1-1,n2); 
 Value[0,n2,m1]:=-temp2/temp1; 
 #print(Value[0,n2,m1]); 
 
end proc: 
>  
> for n2 from 1 to BB do 
 for m from 1 to BB do 
Vlarge(0,n2,m); 
 end do: 
end do: 
>  
>  
>  
>  
> ######### for small P, 0<P<1/2 
Value[1, 1, 1] := 0; 
for i1 from 1 to 10 do 
 for i2 from 1 to 10 do 
  for m from 1 to 10 do 
 if i2>= m then Value[0, i2, m]:=2*P-1;  end if; 
 if i1>= m then Value[i1, i2, m]:=0;  end if; 
   end do: 
  end do: 
 end do: 
  
 
>####### for small P 
for n2 from 1 to 10 do 
for m from 1 to 10 do 
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 Value[0,n2,m]:=((2*P*n2)/(m))-1; 
 #print(0,n2,m,Value[0,n2,m]); 
end do: 
end do: 
 
>  
for n1 from 1 to 2 do 
for n2 from 1 to N2 do 
for m from 2 to M do 
 
print("&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&",n1,n2,m); 
 
#print(Value[n1,n2,m-1]); 
geometry[point](e,0,Value[n1,n2,m-1]): 
geometry[point](f,1,-1): 
 
 
#print(n2-1,m-1,Value[n1,n2-1,m-1]); 
geometry[point](c,0,Value[n1,n2-1,m-1]): 
geometry[point](d,1,2*P-1): 
 
aa:=n2; 
if n2>(m-1) then aa:=m-1; end if; 
Value1(aa,m-1); 
Value[0,n2,m-1]:=Value[0,aa,m-1]; 
 
#print(Value[n1-1,n2,m-1]); 
geometry[point](a,0,Value[n1-1,n2,m-1]): 
geometry[point](b,1,1): 
geometry[line](l1,[a,b]): 
#if m=8 then print("full check"): end if: 
F:=geometry[Equation](l1,[x,y]); 
#print("full check",F): 
 
 
geometry[line](l2,[c,d]): 
P1:=geometry[Equation](l2,[x,y]); 
#print("partial check",P1): 
 
 
geometry[line](l3,[e,f]): 
N:=geometry[Equation](l3,[x,y]); 
#print("Not check",N); 
 
 
#print("Full & Not"); 
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FN:=solve({F,N},{x,y}); 
#print("Full & Partial"); 
FP1:=solve({F,P1},{x,y}); 
#print("Partial & Not"); 
NP1:=solve({N,P1},{x,y}); 
 
 
 
FN:=op(2,op(2,FN)); 
FP1:=op(2,op(2,FP1)); 
NP1:=op(2,op(2,NP1)); 
 
temp1:=minimize(FN-FP1,P=a1..b1); 
temp2:=minimize(FN-NP1,P=a1..b1); 
 
check:=1; 
if temp1>=0 and temp2>=0 then 
print("Case1:Value is intersection of Not-Check and Full-
Check");  
value1:=FN; 
print("the value is",value1); 
check:=1; 
else 
  check:=0; 
  print("It is not Case 1",n1,n2,m); 
  temp3:=minimize(NP1-FP1,P=a1..b1); 
    if temp3<0 then 
    print("Case2:Value is intersection of Not-Check and 
Partial-Check");  
    value1:=NP1; 
    print("the value is",value1); 
    else 
    print("Case3:Value is intersection of Full-Check and 
Partial-Check");  
    value1:=FP1; 
    print("the value is",value1); 
    end if;  
end if; 
 
Value[n1,n2,m]:=value1: 
#print(n1,n2,m); 
#print(Value[n1,n2,m]); 
#if check=0 then print("The plot of intersections"); 
plot([FN,FP1,NP1],P=0..1/2,color=[red,green,blue]); end if: 
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end do: 
end do: 
end do: 
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B.3   The value of game for 𝒗(𝟏, 𝟐, 𝒎, 𝑷) and 𝒗(𝟐, 𝟏, 𝒎, 𝑷)  
for all the values of  𝑷 
 
𝑚 𝑣(1,2, 𝑚, 𝑃), 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2 Type of the 
Case 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 1 
 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
Table B.2.1. 𝑣(1,2, 𝑚, 𝑃), 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2. 
 
𝑚 𝑣(1,2, 𝑚, 𝑃), 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1 Type of the 
Case 
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2 
3 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
0 
0 
 
 
 
 
Case 1, 2 & 3 
Case 1, 2 & 3 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
 
 
Case 1 
Table B.2.2. 𝑣(1,2, 𝑚, 𝑃), 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑚 𝑣(2,1, 𝑚, 𝑃), 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2 Type of the Case 
2 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1, 2 & 3 
Case  3 
 
Case 1 
 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
Table B.2.3. 𝑣(1,2, 𝑚, 𝑃), 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2. 
 
𝑚 𝑣(2,1, 𝑚, 𝑃), 1/2 < 𝑃 < 1 Type of the Case 
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2 
3 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
0 
0 
 
 
 
 
Case 1, 2 & 3 
Case 1, 2 & 3 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 1 
Table B.2.4. 𝑣(1,2, 𝑚, 𝑃), 0 < 𝑃 < 1/2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 4 
A Comparison between Nelder-Mead and Genetic Algorithm for 
Large Scale Optimization Problems 
4.1 Introduction  
Optimization problems can appear in a wide range of sciences where we 
are interested in finding the best solution to a problem after exploring all 
feasible solutions. In this study we aimed to compare the most popular 
direct numerical optimisation methods: the Nelder-Mead algorithm and 
the Genetic algorithm. 
Numerical optimization methods have wide application in many 
optimization problems arisen in different field of science. Instead of 
focusing on exact solution of the problem, they provide an approximation 
of the solution with reasonable accuracy. Hence, they can cover a wider 
range of the complex problems. There are many different numerical 
methods which are compatible with different types of problems and their 
associated characteristics. However, numerical methods can broadly be 
divided into two main categories: gradient methods and direct methods. 
Gradient methods are a form of numerical method which use the special 
features of the objective function such as continuity or gradient to 
establish an iterative method to approximate the solution. These methods 
are usually fast to converge. However, they are not compatible with 
irregular objective functions1 and they may just provide the local optimum 
of the problem. One of the most famous examples of gradient method is 
Newton method which needs differentiation in each iteration. As a result, 
it can be computationally costly and also it is only applicable for 
continuous differentiable functions. As other example of a gradient 
                                                             
1 A function is irregular, if its derivative is not well-defined or does not exist.    
method we can mention Gauss-Newton method introduced by Harley 
(1961) and another algorithm introduced by Marquardt (1977).  
In contrast, direct methods of optimization can be applied with a wider 
range of objective functions as they just require the value of the objective 
function. Convergence is almost surely slower compared to gradient 
methods in any form of the application, but overall there is no general 
criterion for the objective function. The Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm2 
(See Nelder and Mead (1965)) and the Genetic algorithm (see Holland 
(1975)) are two of the most widely used direct methods to deal with 
optimization problems.  
The Nelder-Mead simplex method has been widely used in optimization 
problems. It is also an efficient tool for the optimization problems arising 
in Economics. Hugget, Ventura, Yaron (2011) employ the Nelder-Mead 
algorithm in a Macroeconomics problem when they are investigating 
sources of lifetime inequality. 
Because of the important role of the algorithm in optimization problems it 
appears in many numerical methods handbooks like the one by Press, 
Flannery, Teukolsky and Vettering (1992), beside it is part of the MATLAB’s 
optimization package. However, the method still does not have a 
satisfactory convergence theory. Not only is there a chance of 
approaching and sticking to a local optimum point instead of the global 
one, but also the algorithm may converge to a non-stationary point3. 
McKinnon (1998) provides a number of the examples which cause the 
algorithm to converge a non-stationary point.  
 The inefficiency of the method for higher dimension problems has been 
also observed and analysed in some studies. Byatt (2000) and Torczon 
(1989) provide some results for minimization of the function 𝑓(𝑥) =
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  for different value of 𝑛. They observe in their numerical 
implementation of the method, that it is working inefficiently when 𝑛  is 
moderately large (approximately more than 32). Hans and Neumann 
(2006) provide some theoretical aspects for employing Nelder-Mead 
simplex algorithm for the mentioned function and they show that the 
                                                             
2 Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm should not be mix with Dantzing simplex method (see Dantzing (1947)) 
which is an optimization method in linear programming. 
3 A point with non-zero gradient, which is obviously is not candidate to be a optimum point. 
algorithm is inherently become inefficient by increasing the number of 
parameters. The mentioned works provide an example for the effect of 
the dimensionality4 on the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm, which means 
that we can expect the same problem for some other unconstraint 
optimization problems as well.  
Genetic Algorithm is another direct optimization method which also has 
been widely used for optimization in many different fields like 
electromagnetics (see Weile and Michielssen (1997)), water distribution 
systems (van Zyl and Savic(2004)) and economic predictions (see Shin and  
Lee (2002)). It is also employed in economics and finance optimization 
problems. Pereira (2000) presents the Genetic algorithm as a strong tool 
in finance problems like choosing the optimized parameters for a specific 
trading rule. Another example is Chen and Chang (1995)  which employ 
the Genetic algorithm to solve the economic dispatch problem in large 
scale systems.   
This method starts from the set of initial solutions and iterates toward 
more optimized set of solutions using techniques inspired by natural 
evolution and Darwinian process5. Beside the flexibility to deal with many 
ranges of the optimization problem, Genetic algorithm can also be easily 
coded to solve the unconstraint optimization problems where the 
objective function is not necessarily differentiable.   
Many studies show that Genetic algorithm is working well for big and 
complex problems; however it might be slow to achieve a very precise 
answer (see Yugeng, Tianyou and Weimin (1996)).  
In this study, we briefly compare the Nelder-Mead and Genetic algorithms 
with respect to speed, accuracy and the resilience as the problem 
increases in size. For this matter, by Matlab implementation of both 
algorithms we perform experiments.  
We observe that Nelder-Mead algorithm with regards to the number of 
iterations required and processing time is efficient only when the number 
of parameters is small. We provide an example which shows that, 
regardless of the number of parameters, Nelder-Mead algorithm can stick 
                                                             
4 The effect of large number of parameters on efficiency of the method is called dimensionality. 
5 Full process of Genetic algorithm and its operators are provided in Section 4.3. 
to a local optimum point based on the position of the starting point. 
Genetic algorithm shows faster approaching to the global optimum point 
and also can skip the local optimum points by mutation functions.  
It is obvious that changing parameters or employing hybrid methods may 
improve the final results for some specific problems; however we choose 
to use the default parameters within Matlab for a pure comparison.  
This study has been organized in four sections. In Section 4.2 and 4.3 we 
briefly review the Nelder-Mead and Genetic algorithms and their special 
characteristics. In Section 4.4, we introduce some experiments to compare 
both methods with regarding to accuracy and required time. In Section 
4.4, we provide an experiment to see dependency of Nelder-Mead 
algorithm on the place of the initial guess. We also show this problem can 
be skipped by Genetic Algorithm. 
The Matlab version used to perform the experiments in this study is 
R2013b, and as mentioned, implements the default parameters for 
Genetic and Nelder-Mead algorithm otherwise specified6. 
 
4.2 Nelder-Mead Simplex Algorithm7 
In this section we explain the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm and its main 
characteristics.  
The Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm is based on iteratively constructing 
sequence of simplices, where the amount of the objective function for the 
vertices of the simplex evaluated and sorted in each iteration. The 
algorithm applies four possible operators of reflection, expansion, 
contraction and shrinks to construct a new simplex which has improved 
evaluated functions on its vertices in general. The algorithm terminates 
when the vertices of the simplex meet the stopping criteria. 
For minimizing a real valued function like 𝑓: ℛ𝑁 → ℛ;   𝑓(𝑋) = 𝑦, Nelder-
Mead algorithm is starting with a simplex defined in 𝑁 + 1 dimension. The 
algorithm also can start with just one initial point, where we define a 
                                                             
6 Matlab’s default settings for Nelder-Mead algorithm and Genetic algorithm have fully provided and 
discussed in section 4.2.2 and 4.3.2. 
7 The algorithm is also called Nelder-Mead algorithm. 
function which can construct a simplex in N+1 dimension based on that 
point. Each vertex of the simplex is defined by function values at a 
different point. Having ranked the vertices of the simplex, we aim to move 
the worst performing vertex of the simplex around the centroid to update 
the simplex. In updating procedure four operators of Reflection, 
Expansion, Contraction, and Shrink are used. If we define the centroid of 
the simplex as average of all the vertices of the simplex to expect the 
worst one, then Nelder-Mead operators are as follow.  
a) Reflection: reflect the worst vertex around the centroid. The 
function for finding the reflected point (𝑥𝑟) is 𝑥𝑟 = 𝑐 + 𝛼(𝑐 − 𝑥ℎ) 
where 𝛼 > 0. Figure 4.1 shows the reflection function for a 2-
dimensional simplex. 
 
Figure 4. 1. Reflection operator in Nelder-Mead algorithm, where 𝒇(𝒙𝒔) < 𝒇(𝒙𝒉) < 𝒇(𝒙𝒍) and 
𝒄 is the centroid. 
b) The contraction operator makes the simplex smaller by making the 
worst vertex closer to the centroid. There can be two forms of 
contraction, contraction inside and contraction outside. The 
contracted point can be calculated by 𝑥𝑐 = 𝑐 + 𝛽(𝑥𝑟 − 𝑐) for 
outside contraction or 𝑥𝑐 = 𝑐 + 𝛽(𝑥ℎ − 𝑐) for inside contraction 
where 𝑥𝑟  is the reflection of 𝑥ℎ  and 0 < 𝛽 < 1. Figure 4.2 shows 
the contraction function in a 2-dimentional simplex.   
  
Figure 4. 2. Contraction operator in Nelder-Mead algorithm, where 𝒇(𝒙𝒔) < 𝒇(𝒙𝒉) < 𝒇(𝒙𝒍) 
and 𝒄 is the centroid. The left image shows outside contraction and right image shows inside 
contraction. 
c) Expansion operator, expand the simplex by multiply the distance of 
the worst vertex and the centroid by a coefficient greater than 𝛼. 
The function for finding the expanded point (𝑥𝑒) is 𝑥𝑒 = 𝑐 + 𝛾(𝑥𝑟 −
𝑐) where 𝑥𝑟  is the reflected point of the worst vertex and 
𝛾 > 1, 𝛾 > 𝛼. Figure 4.3 shows the expansion function for a 2-
dimensional simplex. 
 
Figure 4. 3. Expansion operator in Nelder-Mead algorithm, where 𝒇(𝒙𝒔) < 𝒇(𝒙𝒉) < 𝒇(𝒙𝒍) and 
𝒄 is the centroid. 
d) Shrink operator, for a N+1 dimensional simplex calculates the N new 
vertices where all of them are closer to the best vertex. The location 
of the best vertex is kept fixed. The new vertices are calculated by 
𝑥𝑗 = 𝑥𝑙 + 𝛿(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑙). Figure 4.4 shows the Shrink function for a 2-
dimensional simplex. 
 
Figure 4. 4. Shrink operator in Nelder-Mead algorithm, where 𝒇(𝒙𝒔) < 𝒇(𝒙𝒉) < 𝒇(𝒙𝒍). 
𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝛿 can have different values, however in standard Nelder-Mead 
algorithm it always suppose that 𝛼 = 1, 𝛽 =
1
2
 , 𝛾 = 2 and =
1
2
 .  
The steps of the Nelder-Mead algorithm for minimization of a real value 
function with N variables are as follows: 
Step 1: The algorithm starts with the first simplex which has N+1 vertex. 
Nelder-Mead algorithm can also start with just one start point. We can 
define a rule that after receiving the initial guess it will make the other 
vertices of the algorithm. Suppose that 𝑋0, 𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛 are the vertices of 
the first simplex.  
Step 2: The vertices of the simplex are sorted in increasing order. Hence 
we have 𝑓(𝑋0) < 𝑓(𝑋1) < ⋯ < 𝑓(𝑋𝑛). We suppose that 𝑋𝑢 is the best 
vertex, 𝑋𝑣  is the second worst vertex and 𝑋𝑤 is the worst vertex. By 
employing all the vertices except the worst one, we calculate the Centroid 
point (𝐶). 
Step 3: In general, this step updates the worst vertex of the simplex or it 
will shrink the whole simplex. The algorithm first tries the Reflection 
operator. The worst vertex is reflected around the centroid, and value of 
the reflected vertex is evaluated. If we show the reflected point by 𝑋𝑅, 
then 
a) If 𝑋𝑅 is better than the best vertex (𝑓(𝑋𝑅) < 𝑓(𝑋𝑢)), then the 
simplex experience expansion. If the expanded point (𝑋𝑠) was 
better than reflected point, then we accept 𝑋𝑠 and the algorithm 
goes to Step 2. Otherwise, we accept 𝑋𝑅.  
b) If 𝑋𝑅 is just better than the second worst vertex (𝑓(𝑋𝑢) ≤ 𝑓(𝑋𝑅) <
𝑓(𝑋𝑣)), then the worst vertex replaced with 𝑋𝑅, and the algorithm 
goes to Step 2;  
Otherwise, the algorithm runs Contraction in following way. We show the 
inside contracted point by 𝑋𝐶1, and outside contracted point by 𝑋𝐶2.  
a) If 𝑓(𝑋𝑅) < 𝑓(𝑋𝑤) then algorithm calculated outside contracted 
point (𝑋𝐶2), if 𝑓(𝑋𝐶2) < 𝑓(𝑋𝑅) then algorithm accept 𝑋𝐶2 and goes 
to Step 2. Otherwise, the simplex shrinks and the algorithm goes to 
Step 2. 
b) If 𝑓(𝑋𝑅) ≥ 𝑓(𝑋𝑤) then algorithm calculates inside contracted point 
(𝑋𝐶1), if 𝑓(𝑋𝐶1) < 𝑓(𝑋𝑅) then algorithm accept 𝑋𝐶1 and goes to 
Step 2. Otherwise, the simplex shrinks and the algorithm goes to 
Step 2. 
The algorithm is repeated until the time, it gets to one of the stopping 
criteria. The most common stopping criteria are number of Iterations, 
number of function evaluations, X tolerance or function tolerance.  
Example 4.1 briefly explains the steps of the Nelder-Mead algorithm for 
minimization of 𝑓(𝑥) = |𝑥1| + |𝑥2|, where the starting point is [1,1].  
Example 4. 1. In this example we follow few iterations of the Nelder-Mead 
algorithm to find minimizer of 𝑓(𝑥) = |𝑥1| + |𝑥2|, where the starting 
point is [1,1]. The coefficients of the Nelder-Mead functions supposed to 
be the standard one.  
As the initial point is [1,1], by assigning a function to [1,1] we make two 
other vertices. In this example we suppose that the other vertices are 
[3,1] and [1,2]. Hence, we can sort the vertices as 𝑋3
(0)
= [1,3], 𝑋2
(0)
=
[2,1] and 𝑋1
(0)
= [1,1] where 𝑓 (𝑋1
(0)) < 𝑓 (𝑋2
(0)) < 𝑓(𝑋3
(0)
). The 
centroid of the simplex is 𝐶 = [1,1.5]. The reflection of the worst vertex is 
𝑋𝑅
(0)
= [−1,3], which is worse than the worst vertex so algorithm runs 
contract inside witch is [2, 1.5] and better than the worst vertex. Hence 
new simplex is 𝑋3
(1)
= [2,1.5], 𝑋2
(1)
= [2, 1] and 𝑋1
(1)
= [1,1].  
Figure 4.3 shows the some of the first sequential simplices that Nelder-
Mead algorithm makes to find the minimizer of the objective function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1. Three first sequential simplices that Nelder-Mead algorithm makes to find the 
minimizer of 𝒇(𝒙) = |𝒙𝟏| + |𝒙𝟐|.    
4.2.1 Convergence of the Nelder-Mead algorithm 
Despite the wide application of the Nelder-Mead algorithm in 
optimization problems, still there is lack of a global convergent theorem. 
The method is dependent on position of the initial guess. It means that 
based on the position of the initial guess the algorithm may approaches a 
local optimum. There is no way to be sure that the method will show the 
global optimizer of the problem. Adding to the problem of the position of 
the initial guess, in general there is no guarantee the method converge. 
Lagarias, Reeds, Wright and Wright (1998) investigate the convergent 
properties of Nelder-Mead algorithm for the one dimensional functions. 
They show that the method is convergent for the one dimensional strictly 
Solution 
convex functions as long as the expansion function in the Nelder-Mead 
method is genuine. McKinnon (1998) also proves that the method is 
convergent for functions with more than three continuous derivations.  
However, he also provide couple of examples where the Nelder-Mead 
algorithm produce simplices elongate of each other where the best vertex 
is not changing. In fact, he shows that for functions like 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = {
𝜃𝜙|𝑥|𝜏 + 𝑦 + 𝑦2; 𝑥 ≤ 0
𝜃|𝑥|𝜏 + 𝑦 + 𝑦2; 𝑥 ≥ 0
                                                       (4.1.1)                                                    
Nelder-Mead algorithm repeatedly runs inside contraction while the best 
vertex is not changing. This situation is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4. 2. Sequential simplices made by Nelder-Mead algorithm to solve function 4.1.1, 
where 𝝉 = 𝟐, 𝜽 = 𝟔 and 𝝓 = 𝟔𝟎 (see McKinnon (1998)). 
 
4.2.2. Matlab implantation of Nelder-Mead algorithm8 
The Nelder-Mead algorithm is widely used in optimization problems, so it 
is part of the optimization package of many mathematical programing 
softwares like Matlab and Mathematica.  
In Matlab, the method accessible via optimization app and also can be run 
by FMINSEARCH command, on the command line. The initial guess should be 
                                                             
8 The Matlab version used in this study is R2013b. For reviewing the optimization settings, Matlab’s 
users guide is employed (see Ljung (1995)). 
input by the user, then the N+1 vertices for producing the initial simplex is 
made by adding 0.05 to each component of the initial guess. The 
coefficients of the Nelder-Mead algorithm are equivalent to the standard 
Nelder-Mead algorithm. The default stopping criteria are maximum 
iterations of less than 200×number of the variables, maximum  function 
evaluations to be less than 200×number of the variables, and also both X 
tolerance and function tolerance to be less than 10−4.  X tolerance 
specifies the termination tolerance for X. Function tolerance specifies the 
termination tolerance for the objective function value. As an example, if 
the best function value of the previous iteration is 1.10001 and current 
best function value is 1.00000 the algorithm will stop as |1.10001 − 1| <
0.0001. 
Table 4.1, shows the Matlab implementation of Nelder-Mead algorithm 
for finding the minimum value of 𝑓(𝑥) = |𝑥1| + |𝑥2|. The starting point is 
set to be 𝑥 = [1,1], and stopping criteria is Max Iterations less than 10. 
For the rest of the settings, Matlab’s default parameters were employed. 
Iteration   Func-count     min f(x)         Procedure 
     0            1                         2          
     1            3                         2                   initial simplex 
     2            5                        1.975            expand 
     3            7                        1.8625          expand 
     4            9                        1.75625        expand 
     5           11                       1.47812        expand 
     6           13                       1.37187        reflect 
     7           15                       1.14375        reflect 
     8           17                       1.14375        contract inside 
     9           19                       1.01445        expand 
    10           21                     1.01445         contract outside 
  
Exiting: Maximum number of iterations has been exceeded 
         - increase MaxIter option. 
         Current function value: 1.014453 
Table 4. 3. Matlab implementation of the Nelder-Mead algorithm to find the minimum value 
of 𝑓(𝑋) = |𝑥1| + |𝑥2|. The start point is 𝑋 = (1,1), the stopping is Maximum number of 
Iterations less than 10, with the remaining settings being Matlab’s default for Nelder-Mead 
algorithm. The minimum value of the objective function is shown in each iteration of the 
algorithm.  
4.3 Genetic Algorithm and Mathematical Optimization 
4.3.1 History of the Genetic algorithm 
The Genetic algorithm is an optimization method which has been inspired 
by evolution in nature and Darwinian process. The initial idea of 
employing evolution to find optimised solutions appears in the works of 
Rechenberg (1965) and Schwefel (1975, 1977). By employing evolution 
they optimize some real valued parameters which had applications in 
designing devices such as airplane wings. Later, some others scientists like 
Fogel, Owens and Walsh (1966) developed evolutionary programming for 
optimizing a way of allocating candidates to some tasks, by repeatedly 
changing in the allocation. 
Genetic algorithm, as the famous optimization method which nowadays 
we know, was first invented by Holland (1960). He initially was looking for 
a method not to find the optimized solution of a specific problem, but a 
method compatible to the wide range of problems. In his method, the set 
of initial solutions (initial population) is evolving to the next set of 
solutions (next generation) by some functions similar to the “natural 
selection” in Darwinian theory. The algorithm repeatedly produces 
solutions (one generation after another) and will finish when it gets to 
some stopping criteria.     
 
4.3.2 Genetic algorithm for optimization of the real valued functions 
In general, Genetic algorithm first designates a fitness function to a 
problem. A fitness function estimates how much a solution is close to the 
optimum one. In the next step, the algorithm starts with a set of feasible 
solutions called “first generation”. Then, three operators of Selection of 
the fittest, Crossover and Mutation are employed to make another set of 
solutions. Selection chooses the most fitted solutions in the first 
generation and by duplicating them gives them greater chance to produce 
offspring. Crossover produces the next set of solution by fitted solutions 
provided in the previous step. Later, the Mutation function randomly 
chooses one or more of the elements of the current generation and makes 
a random change in which is then present in the next generation. The 
algorithm repeatedly makes one generation after another. Each 
generation is in general more fitted. 
Genetic algorithm’s operators (Selection, Crossover, Mutation) can be 
applied on a population in different ways. The famous methods of 
Selection are Roulette wheel, tournament and uniform. The famous 
crossover methods are single point crossover, two point crossover and 
scattered crossover. The famous way of mutation is Uniform. All these 
operators have been fully explained and discussed in Appendix C. 
The Genetic algorithm can be employed for a wide range of the problems 
with different types of solution sets. In this study we focus on the 
application of Genetic algorithm to find the optimized solution of real 
valued functions. For minimizing a real valued function, first we set the 
suitable fitness function for a program. Besides, following constants are 
set to be fixed through the all the iterations: 
Number of individuals in each chromosome, Length of each chromosome, 
number (or percentage) of best fitted individuals who are going to survive 
in each iteration, selection and crossover methods and mutation rate.  
To optimize a real valued function like 𝑓(𝑋), Genetic algorithm runs 
following steps.  
Step 1: Randomly generate a set of 𝑁 feasible solutions which will be the 
first population. Each number in the set is called an individual 
(Chromosome). To run the operators on these numbers, Genetic algorithm 
changes them to the binary form. It means that each individual in the 
population will be a sequence of 0 and 1. Each 0 or 1 is called a gene. 
Step 2: Calculate the fitness of each individual in the population, based on 
the fitness function. 
Step 3: Based on the fitness scaling, the fittest individuals survive and the 
worst ones are deleted from the population. Best individuals reproduce 
and have a greater chance to produce offspring.  
Step 4: Crossover operator makes a new generation, which should be 
more fitted in general. 
Step 5: Based on the probability of mutation, some percentage of the 
genes are randomly mutated from 1 to 0, or 0 to 1.  
Step 6: Replace the new population with the previous one. 
Step 7: If the stopping criteria has not been met, go to Step 2. 
To illustrate, Example 4.2 applies genetic algorithm to find the minimum 
of 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥2. The first iteration of the method is fully explained, where 
the number of individuals is 5, length of each chromosome is 9, individuals 
have 80 percent chance of survival, selection method is Roulette wheel, 
crossover method is single point and the probability of mutation is 0.03. 
Example 4. 2.  
Step 1: To find the minimum of 𝒇(𝒙) = 𝒙𝟐, 𝒇𝒕(𝒙) = (
𝟏
𝟏+𝒙𝟐
)
𝟐
 can be a 
suitable scaling function. Genetic algorithm first produces 5 randomly 
numbers which can be -14.5, -10.7, -3.13, 3.5, 4.7. We consider following 
binary format for the individuals in each generation. 
-14.5 → [011101000], 
-10.7→[010100111], 
-3.13→ [000111101],  
3.5→[101000111], 
4.7→[101000111]. 
In this form of binary format, the first digit shows the sign of the number; 
the next four digits show the integer part of the number, and last four 
digit show the fraction part of the number. 
Step 2: Fitness of each individual is calculated. Hence, we will have 
𝑓𝑡 (-14.5)=0.000022, 𝑓𝑡 (-10.7)=0.000074, 𝑓𝑡 (-3.13)=0.008578, 𝑓𝑡 
(3.5)=0.005695, 𝑓𝑡 (4.7)=0.001875. 
Step 3: As there is 80 percent chance of survival, all the individuals pass to 
the next generation. Roulette wheel operator chooses 5 random numbers 
between 0 and 5 (𝑅𝑖), also it calculates 𝑃𝑖 =
𝑓𝑡(𝑥𝑖)
∑ 𝑓𝑡(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 , 𝑖 = 1. .5. Table 4.5 
shows all the 𝑃𝑖  and cumulative probability 𝐶𝑖 (𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1 ) and 𝑅𝑖. 
𝑖 𝑃𝑖  𝐶𝑖 𝑅𝑖 
1 0.001293108453 0.001293108453 0.041 
2 0.004326529042 0.005619637495 0.003 
3 0.4950285284 0.5006481659 0.014 
4 0.3286976729 0.8293458388 0.688 
5 0.1706541617 1 0.328 
Table 4. 4. Roulette wheel method and probability of selection of individuals. 
For 𝑗𝜖𝑁;  0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 4 and 𝐶0 = 0; if 𝐶𝑗 < 𝑅𝑖 < 𝐶𝑗+1 then 𝑥𝑖+1 will be kept in 
the population. Hence, the population will be updates to -3.13, -10.7, -
3.13, 3.5, -3.13. As we can see, the algorithm gives more chances to -3.13 
to produce offspring.  
Step 4: Crossover operator produces a new population by crossover 
between -3.13 and -10.7; -10.7 and -3.13; -3.13 and 3.5; 3.5 and -3.13. For 
single point crossover, first a number between 1 to 8 is randomly selected 
(crossover point). Secondly, the digits of the two numbers are swapped 
based on the crossover point. Figure 4.7 illustrates the single crossover 
between -3.13 and -10.7, if the cross over point is 4. 
 
                [000111101] 
                [010100111]    
Figure 4. 5. Single crossover between -3.13 and -10.7, when the crossover point is 4. 
Hence, if we calculate all the other crossovers then the new generation is  
-4.7, 11.5, 2.8, -3.5, 1.6.  
Step 5: There are 5 chromosomes in the population each have 9 genes, as 
the probability of mutation is 0.03, 1 gene ([3 × 5 × 9/100]9) from one of 
the individuals is randomly selected to mutate. Figure 4.5 illustrates a 
possible mutation on -4.7. 
               −4.7 = [000100111]              [100100111] = 4.7 
Figure 4. 6. A mutation on -4.7. 
Step 6: The new generation is 4.7, 11.5, 2.8, -3.5, and 1.6. This new 
population is replaced with previous one.  
Step 2 to 6 will be repeated until the time we get to one of the stopping 
criteria. The most common stopping criteria are number of generations, 
number of function evaluations, function tolerance10 and time limit. 
                                                             
9 The [ ] shows the integer part of a number. 
10 Function tolerance has a same definition as the one in Nelder-Mead algorithm, however here the 
average fitness value of the previous generation is compared to the current average fitness value.  
[000100111] =-4.7 
In each iteration of the Genetic algorithm a new set of individuals is 
produced, the new set has a better fitness in general. This does not mean 
that all the new individuals are better than the previous generation. There 
might be some individuals with less fitness compared to individuals in 
previous generations. This is mostly because of the mutation operator 
which may produce a not fitted solution. We show in Section 4.3.1 that 
how much mutation operator is important part for Genetic algorithm. In 
fact, the efficiency of this method to explore the wider area of feasible 
solution is coming from mutation.  
4.3.3 Mutation function in Genetic algorithm 
In this section we investigate some special features of the Genetic 
algorithm, which make it different from the other algorithms. The most 
different and important operator in Genetic algorithm is Mutation. By 
Mutation we intentionally may produce some less fitted individuals, 
however in general this operator has important role in efficiency and 
accuracy of the Genetic algorithm. We run the following experiment to 
show how mutation function increases the efficiency of the Genetic 
algorithm.   
In this example, the objective function is 𝑓(𝑥) = |𝑥1| + |𝑥2| , where we 
want to estimate its minimum. The ”ga” command in Matlab11 is applied 
where the stopping criteria is the number of generations (to be at most 
10). The defaults within Matlab are accepted for other settings. Table 2.2 
shows the results where the mutation function is Uniform with the rate of 
0.01 in each generation. In contrast, Table 4.6 shows the result when 
there is no mutation. Both tables show the minimum value of the function 
in each generation. In Table 4.6 (Genetic algorithm with mutation rate of 
0.01), the Genetic algorithm is approaching the optimum value (which is 
zero). For some generations the best value of the objective function is not 
changing but the average best value from each generation is improving, 
which means that the algorithm has not stuck and is in progress.  
As we see in Table 4.7 (Genetic algorithm without Mutation), after a few 
Iterations of the algorithm, none of the best value of the objective 
function and average value are changing.  This means that the algorithm 
has stuck on a non-optimizer point, and cannot skip it. 
                                                             
11 In Section 4.3.2 Matlab implantation of Genetic algorithm is fully explained.  
Generations      f-count       Best  f(x)          Mean f(x)   Stall Generations 
    1                        40            0.1082              1.92                   0 
    2                        60            0.1082              1.841                 1 
    3                        80            0.1082              1.484                 2 
    4                        100          0.1082              1.25                   3 
    5                        120          0.1082              0.6499               4 
    6                        140          0.06233            0.3478               0 
    7                        160          0.06233            0.2185               1 
    8                        180          0.06233            0.2496               2 
    9                        200          0.06233            0.1954               3 
   10                       220          0.06233            0.1746               4 
Optimization terminated: maximum number of generations exceeded. 
Table 4. 7. Genetic algorithm implementation to find the minimum value of 𝒇(𝒙) = |𝒙𝟏| +
|𝒙𝟐|. The mutation function has been set to be Uniform with 0.01 rate and the stopping 
criteria is Max Iteration less than 10. For the rest of the settings, Matlab default settings are 
accepted. 
 
Generation      f-count     Best f(x)         Mean f(x)     Stall Generations 
    1                       40           0.08831          0.7234                      0 
    2                       60           0.08831          0.4706                      1 
    3                       80           0.08831          0.2716                      2 
    4                     100           0.08831          0.1759                      3 
    5                     120           0.08831          0.1016                      4 
    6                     140           0.08831          0.09862                    5 
    7                     160           0.08831          0.09862                    6 
    8                     180           0.08831          0.09862                    7 
    9                     200           0.08831          0.09862                    8 
   10                    220           0.08831          0.09862                    9 
Optimization terminated: maximum number of generations exceeded. 
Table 4. 8. Genetic algorithm implementation to find the minimum value of 𝑓(𝑥) = |𝑥1| +
|𝑥2|, where mutation function is not applicable. The stopping criteria is Maximum number of 
Iterations to be less than 10. For the rest of settings, Matlab default settings are accepted.  
 
4.3.4 Matlab Implementation of Genetic algorithm12 
In this section we explain how Genetic algorithm can be run via Matlab’s 
command line and packages.  
Genetic algorithm is part of the optimization package of Matlab, besides it 
can be run via “ga” command in command line.   
These are Matlab’s defaults regarding the population, crossover, 
mutation, stopping criteria and etc. for an unconstraint optimization 
problem.  
                                                             
12 The Matlab version used in this study is R2013b. For reviewing the optimization settings, Matlab’s 
users guide is employed (see Ljung (1995)). 
The populations have 20 individuals; besides the initial population are 
individuals like (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) which are selected uniformly and each 𝑥𝑖  is 
a number between 0 and 1.  
2 is the number of the individuals which is guaranteed will survive and the 
reproduction operator is Roulette wheel. The crossover is scattered. 
Mutation rate is 0.01. Finally, the stopping criteria are as follows: Number 
of generations to be at most 100, infinity time limit, unbounded fitness 
limit, stall generations13 to be at most 50, stall time limit infinity and 
function tolerance to be at most 10−6.  
 
4.4 Comparison of Nelder-Mead algorithm and Genetic 
Algorithm 
Both Genetic algorithm and Nelder-Mead algorithm are considered as 
direct optimization methods. However, as we briefly explained the nature 
of both algorithms is quite different. In this section we aim to provide 
some experiments by Matlab to show how this different nature can affect 
the efficiency of the method in different ways, especially when the size of 
the problem is growing. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 provides a general overview of 
how both algorithms approach the optimized solution. They show the 
results of the first 20 iterations of both algorithms for minimization of 
𝑓(𝑋) = |𝑥1| + |𝑥2|. For Nelder-Mead algorithm the initial point is 
𝑋 = (1,1) and for Genetic algorithm all the first generation elements are 
considered to be 1. As we see, Nelder-Mead algorithm gradually 
approaches to the optimized solution, but the Genetic algorithm quickly 
gets close to the solution. However, later it fluctuates around the solution 
(point [0,0]). 
                                                             
13 When the weighted average change in the fitness function value over all the Stall generations is less 
than Function tolerance, the algorithm terminates. 
 Figure 3.1. The results of 20 first iterations for Nelder-Mead and Genetic algorithm for 
minimization of 𝑓(𝑋) = |𝑥1| + |𝑥2|. The initial point for NM is 𝑋 = (1,1) and all the 
elements of the first generation for GA are 1. Rest of the settings for both algorithms 
are Matlab’s default. 
 
Figure 3.2. The results of 20 first iterations for Nelder-Mead and Genetic algorithm for 
minimization of 𝑓(𝑋) = |𝑥1| + |𝑥2|. The initial point for NM is 𝑋 = (1,1) and all the 
elements of the first generation for GA are [1]𝑛×𝑛. Rest of the settings for both 
algorithms are Matlab’s default. 
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In the next sections we design some Matlab experiments to compare the 
algorithm regarding the speed and accuracy when the size of algorithm is 
growing, and resilience to the initial guess.  
 
4.4.1  Speed and Accuracy 
In this section, we run an experiment on some test functions to compare 
the speed and accuracy of Nelder-Mead algorithm and Genetic algorithm 
when the size of the problem is growing. The algorithms are also 
compared  when we aim to catch a very precise solution. The experiment 
will be as follows. 
Experiment A 
a) For Nelder-Mead algorithm the initial point is set to be 𝑋 = [1]𝑛×𝑛 , 
where 𝑛 is the size of the problem. For rest of the settings, Matlab’s 
default  are accepted. 
b) For Genetic algorithm all the elements of the first generation are set 
to be [1]𝑛×𝑛, for rest of the settings Matlab’s default are accepted. 
c) Both algorithms employed to minimize the real value function 
𝑓(𝑋) = 𝑦, 𝑅𝑛 → 𝑅.  
d) Both algorithms will stop when the best function value gets to 10−2 
and 10−4.  
e) The results regarding to the required time and accuracy will be 
observed. 
In Example 4.3 and Example 4.4, the experiment is employed on the 
functions ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  and  ∑ 𝑥𝑖
4𝑛
𝑖=1  when 𝑛 is increasing. We can observe 
that Nelder-Mead algorithm shows much more sensitivity to the 
number of the parameters. For more than around 200 variables, the 
required time for Nelder-Mead algorithm is growing exponentially and 
it is much more than the Genetic algorithm. 
In Example 4.5, the experiment is employed on the function ∑ |𝑥𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
We can observe that by increasing 𝑛, the accuracy of the 
approximations by Nelder-Mead algorithm is questionable as it may 
stick to a non-stationary point. While, for any number of the 
parameters Genetic algorithm approaches to the optimized solution in 
reasonable amount of time. 
In Example 4.6, the experiment is employed on ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  ,  ∑ 𝑥𝑖
4𝑛
𝑖=1  and 
∑ |𝑥𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1  while we want to get a precise answer like 10
−6. We observe 
that as the size of the problem is growing, both algorithms may face 
different difficulties. While Genetic algorithm is getting too slow, 
Nelder-Mead algorithm may stick on a non-stationary point. When the 
algorithm needs more than 12 hours to get to the answer, we stop it. 
We mention this situation with “more than 12 hours” in the table. 
Example 4. 3. In this experiment the objective function is ∑ 𝒙𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 . 
 
𝑛 
The ratio of required time for NM 
and GA to get 10−2 (NM/GA) 
                                           
The ratio of required time for NM and 
GA to get 10−4 (NM/GA) 
 
2   0.26 
0.12 
0.14 
0.6071 
0.3606 
0.2083 
0.1539 
0.1969 
31.3008 
1.5214 
1.8668 
0.1104 
0.0791 
0.1696 
0.1016 
0.0278 
0.1490 
0.1662 
 0.2649 
12.3427 
2.4187 
 17.44 
5 
10 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
200 
300 
400 
Table 4. 9. Experiment A is applied on ∑ 𝒙𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 . As we see when the number of parameter in 
objective function is more than 200 the required time for Nelder-Mead algorithm is much 
more than Genetic algorithm. 
Example 4. 4. In this experiment the objective function is ∑ 𝑥𝑖
4𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
 
𝑛 
The ratio of required time for NM 
and GA to get 10−2 (NM/GA) 
 
The ratio of required time for NM 
and GA to get 10−4 (NM/GA) 
 
2   0.2661 
 0.2051 
0.1636 
 2.3894 
0.8215 
0.3607 
0.7691 
0.0910 
31.9097 
45.6721 
70.4575 
0.05449 
0.0215 
0.0758 
2.8241 
32.3044 
 0.3835 
0.4408 
 0.2917 
 10.8511 
15.7904 
53.8360 
5 
10 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
200 
300 
400 
Table 4. 10. Experiment A is applied on ∑ 𝑥𝑖
4𝑛
𝑖=1 . As we see when the number of parameter in 
objective function is more than 200 the required time for Nelder-Mead algorithm is much 
more than Genetic algorithm. 
 
Example 4. 5. In this experiment the objective function is ∑ |𝑥𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
  
 𝑛 
Required time to get 10−2 
NM                        GA 
Required time to get 10−4 
NM                    GA 
2 0.019254 0.326261 0.039635 0.259384 
5 Sticks on 0.047 3.686796 Sticks on 0.047 36.998387 
10 Sticks on 5.521 14.558425 Sticks on 5.521 91.690288 
20 Sticks on 14.2314 50.627152 Sticks on 14.2314 433.756074 
40 Sticks on 35.6911 1058.645011 Sticks on 35.6911 8788.1212 
60 Sticks on 53.3124 3656.672690 Sticks on 53.3124 11393.1479 
Table 4. 11. Experiment A is applied on ∑ |𝒙𝒊|
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 . As we see when number of parameters are 
more than 5 the Nelder-Mead algorithm sticks at some non-optimized point and it cannot go 
further, while Genetic algorithm approaches to the optimized solution in a reasonable amount 
of time. 
Example 4. 6. 
 
  𝑛 
Required time to get 10−6 
for ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  
NM                        GA 
Required time to get 10−6 
for ∑ 𝑥𝑖
4𝑛
𝑖=1  
NM                        GA 
Required time to get 10−6 
for ∑ |𝑥𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1  
NM                        GA 
2 0.0257 2.5617 0.0356 0.8056 Sticks on 
0.047 
4863.2788 
5 0.0682 14.7180 0.0788 6.7447 Sticks on 
5.521 
More than 12 
hours 
10 0.2794 38.8972 0.2932 81.3114 Sticks on 
14.2314 
More than 12 
hours 
20 2.0646 473.2614 26.0608 11.8491 Sticks on 
35.6911 
More than 12 
hours 
40 Sticks on 
1.284e-04 
1943.6764 807.5236 28.7380 Sticks on 
53.3124 
More than 12 
hours 
60 3190.1431 7021.4342 12.2927 52.9163 Sticks on 
72.5001 
More than 12 
hours 
80 5242.4003 16169.5863 7.7829 45.4004 Sticks on 
105.20 
More than 12 
Hours 
100 5764.9515 25086.7694 5448.6296 28009.0235 Sticks on 
271.05 
More than 12 
Hours 
200 3693.0811 2048.2406 3358.2581 2254.4718 Sticks on 
541.07 
More than 12 
Hours 
300 Sticks on 
1.236e-04 
More than 12 
Hours 
14756.7279 6318.6862 Sticks on 
1155.22 
More than 12 
Hours 
400 Sticks on 
1.560e-04 
More than 12 
Hours 
Sticks on 
1.421e-04 
More than 12 
Hours 
Sticks on 
7802.43 
More than 12 
Hours 
Table 4. 12. Experiment A is ran for functions ∑ 𝒙𝒊
𝟐𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 , ∑ 𝒙𝒊
𝟒𝒏
𝒊=𝟏  and ∑ |𝒙𝒊|
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏  to get 𝟏𝟎
−𝟔 for 
the objective function. As we see, for large value of 𝒏 Nelder-Mead has more chance to stick at 
a non-optimized point. Meanwhile, the Genetic algorithm slows down. 
 
4.4.2  Resilience 
In this section we run an experiment to show the dependency of the 
Nelder-Mead algorithm on the initial point and it can provide an 
estimation for a local optimum not a global one. However, regardless of 
the position of the initial point the Genetic algorithm can estimate the 
global optimum.  
The experiment is as follow. 
Experiment B 
a) Consider the functions 
 𝑓0(𝑥) = min(|𝑥|, |0.8 − 𝑥| + 0.5),   
𝑓1(𝑥) = min(|𝑥|, |0.4 − 𝑥| + 0.2) and 
𝑓2(𝑥) = min(|𝑥|, |0.2 − 𝑥| + 0.1). 
b) Run the Nelder-Mead algorithm to minimize 𝑓0, 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 several 
times with different initial values. The initial point are  𝑥 =
1.5, 1.3, 1.1, 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3 and 0.1. For rest of the settings 
Matlab’s default settings are accepted. 
c) Run the Genetic algorithm to minimize 𝑓0, 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 several times 
with different initial populations. We suppose all the member of the 
first population are equal 𝑥 where 
 𝑥 = 1.5, 1.3, 1.1, 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3 and 0.1. For rest of the settings 
Matlab’s default settings are accepted. 
Figure 4.12 shows the graph of the 𝑓0, 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 when −1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1. As we 
can see, the global minimum of all the functions are at 𝑥 = 0. Where they 
have a local minimum at  (0.8, 0.5), (0.4, 0.2) and (0.2, 0.1), respectively. 
Table 4.13 shows the results of the Experiment B on these three functions. 
As we can see in Table 4.13 based on the place of the initial guess, the 
Nelder-Mead algorithm may approximate a local minimum instead of 
global minimum, while Genetic algorithm always provides a reasonable 
estimation for the global minimizer.   
 
 Figure 4. 13. 𝒇𝟎, 𝒇𝟏 and 𝒇𝟐 are shown with red, blue and green lines respectively, when 
−𝟏 ≤ 𝒙 ≤ 𝟏. The global minimum value of all the functions is 0, while they have local 
minimum at (𝟎. 𝟖, 𝟎. 𝟓), (𝟎. 𝟒, 𝟎. 𝟐) and (𝟎. 𝟐, 𝟎. 𝟏) respectively.  
 
Initial 
point 
Best function value for 𝑓0(𝑥) 
NM                         GA 
Best function value for  𝑓1(𝑥) 
NM                           GA 
Best function value for 𝑓2(𝑥) 
NM                    GA 
1.5 0.5000 0.001824477 3.5527×
10−15 
0.00798839 3.5527×
10−15 
0.0238 
1.3 0.5000 0.004202643 1.1102×
10−15 
0.00795729 1.1102×
10−15 
0.0051 
1.1 0.5000 0.00184088 3.1086×
10−15 
0.0051631 3.1086×
10−15 
0.0124 
0.9 0.5000 8.4947×
10−4 
0.20000 0.001339320 3.3306×
10−16 
0.0033 
0.7 0.5000 0.0047894 2.8865×
10−15 
0.0029093 2.8865×
10−15 
0.0050 
0.5 4.4408×
10−16 
0.0055141 0.2000 6.2638×
10−4 
4.4408×
10−16 
0.0084 
0.3 8.3266×
10−16 
0.003045794 0.2000 0.0068190 0.1000 0.0089 
0.1 1.9428×
10−16 
0.0092903 1.9428×
10−16 
0.001012 1.9428×
10−16 
2.0888×
10−4 
Table  4. 14. Nelder-Mead Algorithm and Genetic algorithm are applied for 𝒇𝟎, 𝒇𝟏 and  𝒇𝟐 
when the initial point for Nelder-Mead algorithm is changing and the element of the first 
generation in Genetic algorithm are all equal to the initial point of Nelder-Mead algorithm. As 
we can see, where Genetic algorithm always provides a reasonable estimation of the global 
minimum, Nelder-Mead algorithm may approach to the local optimum. 
For more illustrations, Table 4.14 and Table 4.15 show the iterations of the 
Nelder-Mead algorithm and Genetic algorithm for 𝑓0(𝑥) = min (|𝑥|, |0.8 −
𝑥| + 0.5). The initial guess for Nelder-Mead algorithm is 𝑥 = 1. All the 
individuals in the first generation of the Genetic algorithm is also 1. For 
the rest of the settings, Matlab’s defaults are accepted.   
As we see in Table 4.14, Nelder-Mead algorithm approaches the local 
minimum (0.5). In fact, after some iterations the algorithm approaches to 
the local minimum and then by repeatedly inside contracting it makes a 
smaller simplex were the best vertex is always 0.5. There is no operation 
embedded in Nelder-Mead algorithm which makes it able to skip the local 
minimum. 
In Table 4.15, we see that initially the algorithm shows the amount of the 
local optimum. However, quickly it gets closer to the global optimum. 
Both the best value of and average of values of a generation can increase 
in one specific generation (for example iteration 40), but in general the 
algorithm is proving an approximation for the global optimum. In fact, 
mutation operator embedded in Genetic algorithm makes it able to jump 
another area of feasible solutions; as a result it will explore a wider area.     
Iteration   Func-count     min f(x)    Procedure 
     0            1                     0.7          
     1            2                     0.7         initial simplex 
     2            4                     0.6         expand 
     3            6                     0.5         reflect 
     4            8                     0.5         contract inside 
     5           10                    0.5         contract inside 
     6           12                    0.5         contract inside 
     7           14                    0.5         contract inside 
     8           16                    0.5         contract inside 
     9           18                    0.5         contract inside 
    10           20                   0.5         contract inside 
    11           22                   0.5         contract inside 
    12           24                   0.5         contract inside 
    13           26                   0.5         contract inside 
 Optimization terminated: 
 the current x satisfies the termination criteria using OPTIONS.TolX of 1.000000e-04  
 and F(X) satisfies the convergence criteria using OPTIONS.TolFun of 1.000000e-04 
Table 4. 15. Nelder-Mead algorithm is applied for the objective function 𝒇𝟎(𝒙) =
𝐦𝐢𝐧 (|𝒙|, |𝟎. 𝟖 − 𝒙| + 𝟎. 𝟓). The start point is 𝒙 = 𝟏 and the stopping criterion is 𝟏𝟎−𝟒 
Function-tolerance. As we see the algorithm sticks on the local minimum 𝒇(𝒙) = 𝟎. 𝟓.   
 
 
 
 
Generation  f-count       Best f(x)          Mean f(x)     
    1                  40                 0.5                  0.5587                
    2                  60                 0.5                  0.6039                
    5                 120              0.2795             0.75                     
   10                220              0.06749          0.3312                 
   15                320              0.0286             0.2483                
   20                420              0.0286             0.2859                
   30                620              0.009367         0.1583               
   40                820              0.00797           0.2894               
   50               1020             0.00797           0.1568              
   51               1040             0.00797           0.2081              
Optimization terminated: average change in the fitness value less than options.TolFun. 
Table 4. 16. Genetic algorithm is applied for the objective function 𝒚 = 𝐦𝐢𝐧 (|𝒙|, |𝟏 − 𝒙| +
𝟎. 𝟓). The stopping criteria is 𝟏𝟎−𝟒 Function-tolerance, the first generation is 𝒙 = 𝟏. The 
algorithm provides the reasonable approximation of the global minimum point 𝒙 = 𝟎. 
 
Conclusion 
Nelder-Mead and Genetic algorithms are widely used in different fields of 
science as robust optimization methods. In this study, we compare these 
two methods in the sense of required time, accuracy and dependency to 
the initial guess for the problem with large scale. All the experiments show 
that Nelder-Mead algorithm can be efficient just when the objective 
function has a small number of parameters. Mutation operator within 
Genetic algorithm is a strong tool for the efficient progress of the 
algorithm, and its approach to the global optimum point.  
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Appendix C 
In this appendix, we explain more about the operators in Genetic 
algorithm. In general, the algorithm has three operators which are: 
Selection and reproduction, Crossover and Mutation. While the general 
format of the algorithm is the same, the operator may vary in different 
problems (see Mitchell (1998)). 
C.1 Selection  
Selection can have different forms like Roulette wheel, Tournament or 
Elite count (Elitism). Each method has its own characteristics and it is 
suitable for specific type of problems. It may happen also that first Elitism 
operator is run and then another selection method also is employed. 
a) Roulette wheel Selection  
In this operator, first based on the fitness function (𝑓𝑡(𝑥)) all the 
individual’s fitness are evaluated. Then 𝑃𝑖 =
𝑓𝑡(𝑥𝑖)
∑ 𝑓𝑡(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 , 𝑖 = 1. . 𝑛 and 
𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑖
𝑗=1  (𝐶0 = 0) are calculated where 𝑛 is the number of individuals 
in the population. Obviously the more fitted individual will have higher 
probability (𝑃𝑖). We can demonstrate the situation in following graph, 
where area 3 is for the most fitted area 1 is for less fitted individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C. 1. The Roulette wheel Selection operator. 
𝑛 numbers between 0 and 1 are randomly selected. For 𝑗𝜖𝑁;  0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤
𝑛 and 𝐶0 = 0; if 𝐶𝑗 < 𝑅𝑖 < 𝐶𝑗+1 then 𝑥𝑖+1 will be kept in the population. 
Obviously by this method the more fitted individuals has more chance to 
reproduce. 
b) Tournament Selection 
In this operator, first based on the fitness function (𝑓𝑡(𝑥)) all the 
individual’s fitness are evaluated. If you want to pass 𝑙 < 𝑛 (𝑙  is called 
 
𝐶1 
𝐶2 
𝐶3 
1 − 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
tournament size) number of individuals to the next generation; first,  𝑗 < 𝑙 
number of individuals are randomly (uniform distribution) selected and 
the best individual is kept in the population. This procedure will be 
repeated until the time that there is  𝑙 number of individuals in the 
population. 
c) Elitism Selection 
Selection operators determines in each generation how many of the less 
fitted individuals will die (will be deleted from the population). It can be in 
the form of exact number of individuals or percentage. 
C.2 Crossover 
Crossover produces a new generation by parents being selected by 
Selection operator. Single point cross over, two point cross over and 
scattered crossover are the most methods of crossover.   
a) Single point crossover 
For single point cross over between chromosome A and B, first a number 
like 𝑗 between 1 and 𝑚 (length of the chromosome) is randomly selected. 
Then for the offspring the first 𝑗 genes are copied from chromosome A 
and rest of the genes from chromosome B.  
 
If we show the parents chromosomes by [a,b,c,d,e,f,g] and [1,2,3,4,5,6]. 
Then single crossover is as follow if the crossover point is 4. 
                       [a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h]  
                       [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. 
Figure C. 2. A single point Crossover. 
b) Two point Crossover 
It is similar to single point crossover, however two numbers are selected 
randomly between 1 and 𝑚 (length of the chromosome). 
If we show the parents chromosomes by [a,b,c,d,e,f,g] and [1,2,3,4,5,6]. 
Then two point crossover is as follow if the crossover point is 4 and 6. 
 
[a,b,c,d,5,6,7] 
                       [a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h]  
                       [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. 
Figure C. 3. A two point Crossover. 
c) Scattered Crossover 
It first generates a random binary vector with the same length of the 
chromosomes. Then wherever in the vector is 1, the gene is selected from 
parent chromosome A and wherever in the vector is 0, the genes is 
selected from parent chromosome B. 
If we show the parents chromosomes by [a,b,c,d,e,f,g] and [1,2,3,4,5,6]. 
Then scattered crossover is as follow if the crossover vector is 
 [1 0 1 1 0 0 1]. 
                       [a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h]  
                       [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. 
Figure C. 4. A Scattered Crossover. 
 
C.3 Mutation 
The Mutation operator randomly changes some genes/ chromosomes in 
the population. The typical way of mutation is first calculating A=[number 
of individuals in the population×length of each chromosome×mutation 
rate]14. Then randomly A number of the genes in a population are selected 
to be changed. 
 
 
                                                             
14 [ ] calculates the integer part of a number. 
[a,b,c,d,5,6,h] 
[a,2,c,d,5,6,h] 
[1 0 1 1 0 0 1] 
